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Abstract

The Ferguson Effect in Contemporary Policing:
Assessing Police Officer Willingness to Engage the Public
by
Christopher Mercado

Advisor: Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld

Researchers suggest that as public scrutiny and video recording of violent/tumultuous police
encounters increase, police would back away from proactive enforcement, resulting in an
increase in crime—the Ferguson Effect. Recent scholarship refined these concerns over police
disengagement with the study of de-policing, while other scholars explored police selflegitimacy, in order to explain law enforcement behavior, given the immediacy and ubiquity of
social media and digital communication. This study surveyed 792 law enforcement officers from
10 different police agencies in the United States, to ascertain if police officers’ personal and
contextual characteristics influence their decision to either take enforcement action (i.e.,
summons or arrest) or extend discretion (i.e., let them go) to the people they interact with during
minor offenses. Respondents were presented with six vignettes, which included cars stops,
public demonstrations, and street fights. The first three scenarios established a behavioral
baseline for law enforcement action, while the next three scenarios had the added variable of
presenting challenges to the officer’s authority: cell phone recording, verbal challenge, or a
passive challenge (e.g., jotting down name, badge number, etcetera). Respondents were
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provided open fields in the survey to explain their enforcement decisions. Logistic regression
testing found significance between challenging law enforcement and the resulting enforcement
decision. The presence of cell phones recording police-public interactions will often not end in
enforcement. Verbal and passive challenges however, will result in the officer taking
enforcement action. When police are dealing with members of minority communities they are
likely to extend discretion 65% of the time. Enforcement action taken for teenage offenders is
about 49%. Testing for intersectionality demonstrated significant relationships for race and
gender, that would not be readily discernable with traditional variable designations. This study
concludes with a policy recommendation based on the New York City Police Department’s
recruitment strategies to address one of the primary concerns in policing—effective recruitment
policy to create tomorrows equitable and inclusive police departments.

Key words: Ferguson Effect, police perception, Role Theory, police discretion, intersectionality
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Introduction
On August 9, 2014 an unarmed Michael Brown was shot and killed by a Ferguson,
Missouri Police Officer (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015b). Brown’s death was one of several
deaths (mostly unarmed black men/youth) resulting from police contact during the course of
apprehension, investigation, mistaken use of force, or while in custody—Eric Garner (July
2014), Akai Gurley (November 2014), and Tamir Rice (November 2014). Social media
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were used to broadcast cell phone footage of
many of these types of fatal encounters with police. Their deaths (along with several others
before and after 2014) sparked national discussions on policing. There were protests in many
American cities. Two New York City police officers were assassinated on December 20, 2014
by a perpetrator, stating he acted out of retaliation to the climate created by police (Mueller &
Baker, 2014; New York City Police Department, 2015).
The national conversation over police/public behavior continued into 2015. In July 2016,
five Dallas police officers were killed and nine injured by an assailant just days after the police
killings of Alton Sterling in Louisiana and Philando Castile in Minnesota. The immediacy of
social media often fueled the public narrative of police killing unarmed men of color, even when
that narrative was incorrect (Mac Donald, 2016). The “hands up don’t shoot” mantra commonly
chanted at anti-police demonstrations on the heels of the Ferguson shooting was predicated on a
false narrative that Michael Brown had his hands up and was surrendering to Ferguson Police
Officer Darren Wilson (U.S. Department of Justice Report, 2015b). Emerging from these events
was concern that the continued barrage and devaluing of police, coupled with legitimate threats
to officer safety and job security would result in police choosing not to do their jobs, triggering
an increase in crime—the Ferguson Effect (Mac Donald, 2016; Mac Donald, 2016a).
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Local governments and police departments (for a variety of reasons) were slow to
respond to dispel viral social media narratives and reassure communities, which may have
contributed to escalating community malcontent. The lack of appropriate government response
to community frustration after police shootings in 2014, was most notable in Ferguson, Mo.,
where “the riots that followed the fatal police shooting of Michael Brown...[demonstrated how
police] did not understand the gravity of the public anger and fired ‘Stingerballs, PepperBalls,
bean bag rounds and baton rounds’ in failed attempts to quell the escalating disturbance”
(Serrano & Pearce, 2015). The U.S. DOJ report on the Ferguson Police Department (FPD)
suggests the FPD’s poor response was probably the result of executive miscalculation. “It
appears that many police and City officials were unaware of this distrust and fear of Ferguson
police among African Americans prior to August 2014” (Department of Justice, 2015, p. 83).
For example, Ferguson’s Chief told DOJ that “prior to the Michael Brown shooting he thought
community-police relations were good” (Department of Justice, 2015, p. 83).
Candid and credible counter-messaging after tumultuous police events is critical in
staving public protests. The public narrative and perception after the civil unrest in Ferguson,
Missouri suggested American police officers are abusive, militarized, and racist against minority
communities. Bratton (2014; 2015a; 2015b; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Tumin, 2012)
explained that police culture is a complex construct of multiple internal and external influencers.
Failing to clearly define law enforcement’s role as protector and tip of the spear against crime
and disorder puts the public in danger from criminals and erodes public trust in police
(specifically) and government (overall). Given the current state of American policing, this
dissertation examines the role officers feel they have in society and what social
factors/conditions impact that role by measuring low-level, discretionary enforcement behavior.
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Research exploring police behavior and police efficacy often examines officers’ roles by
assessing public/community satisfaction in patrol zones/sectors, hot spots, or community
policing programs and their ability to reduce crime (Gelber, Isen, & Kessler, 2014; Heller, 2014;
Billies, 2013; Hawdon & Ryan, 2011; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010; Gianakis & Davis, 1998;
Liou & Savage, 1996). Recent scholarship has delved into assessing officer self-worth and
whether self-definition impacts officer performance (Nix & Wolfe, 2015; Nix & Wolfe, 2016;
Wolfe & Nix, 2016a; Wolfe & Nix, 2016c). Of the many studies on police behavior, the existing
research neglects to examine how police officers perceive their role in addressing medium to
low-level criminality (i.e., some misdemeanor offenses and petty offenses/violations) that do not
mandate automatic arrest (i.e., discretionary enforcement action). This researcher chose to
exclude more serious offenses (i.e., felonies) because they often mandate arrest (e.g., robbery,
felonious assault, sexual assault, grand larceny, burglary, etcetera) and leave officers little
discretion (New York City Police Department Patrol Guide, 2017). Measuring more serious
offenses is difficult for researchers to gauge, even when respondents are promised anonymity
during surveys or interviews, because officers admitting they chose not to arrest a subject for
serious offenses (e.g., felonies or violent misdemeanors) may constitute official misconduct.
Problem Statement
This study researches police behavior post-Ferguson by exploring police/LE perceived
roles and their resulting enforcement decisions. Is there a relationship between perceived roles
and police behavior? Do officers change their exercise of discretion based on the threat of social
media exposure, the race, or gender of the subject, or does this type of police behavior vary by
officer (race/gender) or the self-identified role for the officer? In short, this study tries to
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ascertain, “Are police officers in America consistent in their exercise of discretionary
enforcement?”
Law enforcement officers from ten departments in North American cities in the United
Stated are the unit of analysis in this study. The independent variables in this study fall into two
categories: 1) Personal characteristics (age, race/ethnicity, gender, education, family status), and
2) Contextual characteristics (rank, tenure, assignment, role). The dependent variable is the
dichotomous decision (yes/no) to take police enforcement action (either arrest or summons) for
misdemeanor and petty offenses. Researchers advocate both personal as well as contextual
characteristics influence police decision-making (Brooks, Piquero & Cronin, 1993; Brown &
Frank, 2006; Paoline, Myers & Worden, 2000; Poteyeva & Sun, 2009; Sun 2003).
Significance of the Problem
If compromised police-community relations remain unaddressed, a continued anti-police
narrative will only erode police-community trust. Police derive the requisite power and
legitimacy to do their jobs from the people they serve (Tyler 1990; Tyler 2004; Tyler 2011; Tyler
& Huo, 2002; Ivkovic, 2011). The literature demonstrates police (and the culture of policing) are
essentially barometrically sensitive to both positive and negative public sentiments. The extent
of this sensitivity on law enforcement’s ability to do their job is under examination here.
There are also grave political and policy implications with trying to define, measure, and
counteract the Ferguson Effect as we have seen seminal political issues like health care, gun
rights, and immigration policy subject to moral panics (a sense of policy urgency) which often
leads to hastily enacted rules and regulations with unforeseen deleterious outcomes (Young,
2009).
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Ferguson, police behavior, and policy
The urgency in exploring this topic is partially driven by the ubiquity of cell phones and
their ability to broadcast potentially volatile interactions with police, with no context or
exposition. From an advocacy and social justice perspective, recording police-public
interactions, is an important tool in correcting disparate policing practices across different
communities. Gonzales and Cochran (2017) specifically examined BWCs and argued that,
“people are less likely to engage in socially undesirable behavior if they know they are being
watched” (p. 309). This is relevant to this research because, “This civilizing effect also operates
on the other party in the encounter—the police officer,” which demonstrated officers with BWCs
used force half the time, and received one-tenth as many civilian complaints (Gonzales &
Cochran, 2017, p. 309).
Irrespective of the recording platform (i.e., cell phone or BWC), the public’s safety
cannot be compromised by any potential chilling effect from introducing video capture and
broadcasting. De-policing would be a form of chilling effect. Chilling effects usually follow a
predictable pattern, eventually fading, with a return to normalcy. Similar disengagement
behavior (called burnout) is observed among social workers and psychologists when clinical
practitioners are faced with powerlessness and ineffectiveness in helping their clients/patients
(Skovholt, Grier, & Hanson, 2001).
In policy analysis, we learn that these disruptive events are sometimes sufficient to reset
the equilibrium and create a new operational standard but there may be a lag effect associated
with it (Baumgartner, Linn, & Boydstun, 2009). Resulting policy from these disruptive events
often fails due to flaws in implementation (Smith & Larimer, 2012).
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Research Questions
This project pursued answers to six research questions. Central to these questions is the
importance of discerning what (if anything) changes police enforcement behavior of today’s
officers. The basis for these questions recognizes the ubiquity of social media, coupled with
post-Ferguson protests, the assassinations of police officers, and national discussions on police
use of force. These research questions were also designed to foster a greater understanding of
police behavior by identifying whether personal or contextual characteristics of the officer,
define enforcement behavior.
Assessing how police officers perceive and define their roles is critical in understanding
police behavior. This explores the malleability of an officer’s perceived role in their decision to
apply discretion or zero tolerance to certain public behavior. These questions are also trying to
define the presence of triggers to de-policing such as cell phones, verbal taunts, or even police
body worn cameras (BWC), as influencers on enforcement behavior. Several researchers contend
police behavior and decision-making are related to contextual, individual, organizational, and
environmental factors (Brooks et al., 1993; Brown & Frank, 2006; Poteyeva & Sun, 2009;
Worden, 1993). What remains unexplored is the relationship between these factors and officers’
perceived role in influencing decisions during discretionary situations.
The research questions (RQ) are:


RQ 1: Do verbal and non-verbal challenges from the public to an officer influence their
decision to take enforcement action?



RQ 2: Does a police officer’s perceived law enforcement role govern their decision to
take police enforcement action?
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RQ 3: What personal characteristics of police officers influence their decision to take
police enforcement action?



RQ 4: What contextual characteristics of police officers influence their decision to take
police enforcement action?



RQ 5: What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with members of minority
communities?



RQ 6: What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with teenagers?



RQ 7: How do law enforcement perceive the media, when reporting on law enforcement
events?



RQ 8: Is there intersectionality occurring between officers’ race and gender in the
decision to take police enforcement action?
Since the literature is sparse on the types of challenges likely to change police officers’

enforcement behavior, RQ 1 looks to answer whether types of challenges to police officers
influence their enforcement decision. For Role Theory to be present, there needs to be a
measurable nexus where a person’s perceived role (rather than their title) is an influencer in a
resulting behavior by measuring the presence of statistical significance to their enforcement
decision, which was the basis for RQ 2. RQ 3 and RQ 4 examined police officers’ personal and
contextual characteristics (respectively) in the enforcement decision. Role Theory posits both
personal and contextual characteristics shape the role a person plays in society and consequently
shapes their behavior.
RQ 1 through RQ 4 are predicated on police officers interacting with only adult subjects,
with no mention of the subject’s ethnicity. Given that the events leading up to and eventually
following the Ferguson-related protests involved members of the minority community (i.e.,
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persons of color) and young people, RQ 5 and RQ 6 ask police officers for their enforcement
decisions, assuming the subjects were members of minority communities (i.e., non-Caucasian)
and teenagers respectively.
RQ 7 was designed to test whether Labeling Theory is present by asking whether
negative media reporting on law enforcement events (defined as police misconduct stories,
officers injured in the line of duty, etc.) influence their conduct as police officers. This ties into
the survey questions that ask how officers perceive the media when reporting on police-related
issues. Their open field responses will help qualify their selections to determine whether the
media’s reporting forms a type of label and whether that label is internalized and adopted in their
resulting behavior as law enforcement officers.
RQ 8 originates from the literature on intersectionality to help identify the presence of
underrepresented groups. When designing policy or determining strategy, the principles of
equity and inclusion require that agency leaders and executives make decisions with no disparate
impact on a population or group. Intersectionality scholarship demonstrates several examples
where failing to include an intersectionality test in research (particularly policy research) can
mask statistically significant groups among a larger aggregate such as gender or race. RQ 8
explores whether there is intersectionality occurring between officers’ race and gender.
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Literature Review
The literature examining police behavior is well developed, growing, and
multidisciplinary. Past scholars have examined several characteristics affecting officer behavior
with particular interest in the areas of arrests and use of force (Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Fyfe,
1988; Fyfe, 1981). Recent research exploring contemporary police behavior and its influencers
examine four key areas: 1) the Ferguson Effect, 2) De-policing, 3) Police officer self-legitimacy,
and 4) Public perception of law enforcement. This literature review explores these four areas
and identifies commonality in the literature, prevalent theories and methods, main findings,
outliers, and gaps in the literature.
Much of the empirical work on police behavior and police conduct center on exploring
the Ferguson Effect and self-legitimacy. Of note are four studies on Ferguson—three are
quantitative studies utilizing a variety of statistical testing (e.g., structural equation modeling,
ordinary least squares regression, and discontinuous growth modeling) as well as different
methodologies—analysis of existing government crime data and survey data culled after
exposure to video vignettes (Greenwood, Sorenson & Warner, 2016; Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe &
Shjarback, 2016; Nix & Wolfe, 2016). The fourth Ferguson study is a qualitative analysis,
concluding that it may not be possible to control for implicit bias in the criminal justice system
after examining the events of Ferguson in the context of jury selection (Foreman, 2015).
In terms of policing, self-legitimacy can best be described as the confidence law
enforcement officers have in their authority (Nix & Wolfe, 2015). Examinations of police selflegitimacy are mostly quantitative analyses. Using multivariate logistic regression, Wolfe and
Nix (2016c) found sheriff’s deputies have less trust in their law enforcement (LE) agencies when
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their supervisors failed to protect procedural justice within their LE organization. They also
found, self-legitimacy positively correlates to trust within a LE agency.
LE agency policies that fail to support police officers and control for negative public
sentiment reduce LE self-legitimacy and negatively impact officer motivation. Nix and Wolfe
(2015) found that negative publicity lowered officer motivation and decreased their sense of
motivation. This resulted in a decreased sense of officer self-legitimacy. A key finding in the
Nix and Wolfe (2015) study found that despite an increase in negative publicity, there was no
statistically significant sense of increased danger to police officers from negative publicity. That
finding is promising (in a sample size of 567 officers) because it intimates that despite increased
negative public scrutiny, officers do not interpret negative publicity as a safety threat from the
public.
A fundamental weakness this researcher observed in these studies of police behavior
(particularly with self-legitimacy) is that they are not sufficiently temporal. Studies of
organizational theory contend that many organizational spikes or incidents of aberrant behaviors
will typically regress toward the mean over time in healthy organizations (Holzer & Schwester,
2016; Rainey, 2014; Tompkins, 2005;). Additionally, worker motivation, organizational culture,
and worker maturation (Holzer & Schwester, 2016; Rainey, 2014; Tompkins, 2005) are some of
the key variables that influence worker behavior that may be impacting officer self-legitimacy,
but those characteristics are not captured in these analyses.
Early Studies of Police Behavior
Although cops will probably tell you, “We’re all the same, we protect people,” this
oversimplification masks the complex interaction between community and policing in shaping
police behavior. Liederbach and Travis (2008) examined earlier assertions by Wilson (1968) and
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found although “local political culture are not related to police style… [there is] a significant
relationship between population size and style of policing” (p. 461). Wilson (1968) identified
three functional categories for law enforcement officers: 1) Law enforcement—legalistic style, 2)
Order maintenance—watchman style, and 3) Service delivery—informally interact with citizens
(as cited by Liederbach & Travis, 2008). Larger communities tend toward a legalistic style.
Smaller communities and poorer communities tend toward the watchman style (Liederbach &
Travis, 2008).
Some studies differ in their findings on the influencers of police officer attitudes and
behavior but their differences derive from the officer’s assignment. Engel and Worden (2003, p.
131) found officers’ perceptions of their supervisors and the priorities set by those supervisors
(rather than officers’ personal characteristics) “affect [the] amount of time they spend conducting
problem solving” but this study was conducted with officers assigned to community policing
units. Different officer responsibilities within policing appear to have different results.
What is the Ferguson Effect?
The Ferguson Effect is defined as, “continuous negative publicity surrounding the police
at a national level [which results in] the police…withdrawing from their duties in order to avoid
being the next viral video on YouTube” (Martinez, 2015; Nix & Wolfe, 2016; Sinyangwe, 2016;
Sutton, 2015). MacDonald (2016) hypothesized that this chilling effect would result in an
increase in national crime rates. The Ferguson Effect is a recent phenomenon fueled, “in large
part to the advent of social media and the ease with which citizens can record police behavior on
cell phones and upload to the internet for millions to view” (Nix & Wolfe, 2016).
Concerns over emboldened anti-police sentiments resulting in police disengagement were
raised by Sergeant’s Benevolent Association president Ed Mullins—a labor union representing
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NYPD Sergeants. In August 2018, two incidents of the public taunting police and confronting
responding officers, did not end in arrests but was broadcast on social media (Mullins, 2018, pp.
1-3). A concern with these types of incidents is the fear of the public creating No Go Zones,
which is a colloquial expression to denote places where certain people are not welcome, and
where unwelcomed respondents can expect to be treated brusquely, if they decide to enter the
area. The security concern with these types of confrontations is that law enforcement cannot be
excluded from their geographical area of employment, regardless of public sentiment.
Does the Ferguson Effect influence crime rates?
Fundamental to the Ferguson Effect is the notion that there will be an increase in crime.
The discourse on de-policing and its effect on crime was sparked by comments made by then
FBI Director James B. Comey at the University of Chicago Law School on October 23, 2015.
Comey speculated the simultaneous increase in murders in some American cities was caused by
police feeling under siege by social media and videoing police activities. The resulting chilling
effect (Comey speculated) has led to an increase in some crime.
Rushin and Edwards (2017) demonstrate how Comey’s observation of increased police
oversight results in de-policing has been a perennial concern for scholars. Wolfe and Nix
(2016a) would agree in part with Comey as their research demonstrates that negative publicity
makes law enforcement less likely to engage in community partnerships, which is vital in
cooperative, less intrusive policing (TED, 2015). The data however on de-policing is not
conclusive. Studying de-policing has proven difficult. Pyrooz et al (2016) found increased
robberies in the wake of Ferguson but his study could not duplicate his findings in other large
American cities.
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Other triggers that impact the crime rate
Mac Donald’s Ferguson Effect is one example where social changes or pressures on
police can influence law enforcement behavior. Strains on police behavior can also come from
within an officer’s own department. Unpopular or adverse policy changes in a department in
conflict with police norms, culture, or sense of self-defined worth can trigger de-policing,
resulting in an increase in crime. Rushin and Edwards (2017) demonstrated an uptick in crime
rates for all police departments subject to 42 U.S.C. §14141. Criminal code 14141 is a 1994
reform holding LE and corrections personnel accountable for violating the constitutional rights
of juveniles (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/14141).
This increase in crime is the result of de-policing which occurs when police “pull back”
from their duties out of fear of retribution, increased scrutiny, disciplinary action, or resentment.
For policymakers, “…[there are] serious implications for the study of police regulation…[as
it]…suggests that attempts to document, oversee, and regulate unconstitutional misconduct by
American police departments may reduce public safety” (Rushin & Edwards, 2017). The
outcome may be a hesitancy for reformers and legislatures to enact much needed legislation to
correct, evolve, or circumscribe police culture.
Rushin and Edwards (2017) modeled two scenarios in de-policing. Model one
hypothesized “the mere presence of public scrutiny…increases crime.” Model two hypothesized
“the imposition of external regulations increases crime.” Using difference-in-difference
regression analysis, they found the introduction of external regulations did increase property
crime rates (including larceny and burglary) from zero year (i.e., time of imposition) through the
fourth year. After the fourth year, property crime decreased, demonstrating a nullified effect
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from external regulations (Rushin & Edward, 2017). Increased scrutiny contributed little to
increases in crime rates.
Their study did not explain why external regulation had a frontloaded negative effect on
crime. We also do not understand which regulations on police increased crime nor do we
understand the behavioral effect external regulation had in triggering de-policing. Rushin and
Edward suggest surveying officers before imposing future external regulations to foment greater
LE buy-in and thereby lessen the opportunities for de-policing.
Challenging the notion of the Ferguson Effect
Sinyangwe (2016) argued that claims of the Ferguson Effect are invalid because the
expected chilling effect from public protests did not spawn a reduction in police killings. To
support his claim, Sinyangwe points to 665 police killings in 2014 increasing 8% to 721 in 2015.
He goes on to argue, “[the] Marshall Project and the Justice Department have found no evidence
that violent crime has significantly increased among the nation’s largest cities” (Sinyangwe
2016). Sinyangwe’s premise is fundamentally flawed since his account does not distinguish
when police use illegal or excessive force from incidents where law enforcement used justified
force.
Pyrooz et al (2016) demonstrated there is no evidence of a Ferguson Effect after
examining overall crime data statistics 12 months pre-Ferguson and post-Ferguson. However,
they did witness a rise in post-Ferguson robberies. Although overall national crime is not
showing signs of increase, Morgan and Pally (as cited in Nix & Wolfe, 2016) found an increase
in Baltimore’s shootings, homicides, robberies and car thefts accompanied by a decrease in
arrests (i.e., police enforcement activity) possibly attributable to the Ferguson Effect.
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While the Ferguson Effect’s impact on crime remains under investigation by researchers,
the negative publicity from Ferguson and related incidents, “[does] appear to have an effect on
police behaviors…[and] such an effect seems to occur regardless of whether a city has
experienced a high-profile incident of its own” (Nix & Wolfe, 2016). The trepidation or crisisof-confidence some law enforcement officers experience from negative media attention and
public discontent causes some officers to question their self-legitimacy. For some officers,
vocal/visible police scrutiny and the added factor of citizens leveraging technology to record
police activities (i.e., cell phones and social media) may be sufficient to give some officers
enough pause and self-reflection to reconsider using force, particularly against young men of
color. However, there is no evidence that altering or attacking police officer self-legitimacy is
beneficial to any community.
De-policing
Attributed to Ferguson is the idea of police consciously avoiding their sworn duty in
response to negative public scrutiny of police policies, procedures, and public interaction
(usually after a controversial exercise of police power or police use of force). De-policing or the
deliberate decision by police officers not to take enforcement or proactive action for fear of
negative public or organizational scrutiny has met with mixed empirical evidence (Pyrooz et al,
2016).
Scholars proceed with suspicion when examining assertions of de-policing and
disengagement on the heels of tumult in police/community relations. According to Stone,
Foglesong & Cole (2009) the LAPD’s consent decrees did not trigger any form of de-policing.
In fact, many crime indices decreased in Los Angeles, California. Measuring de-policing has
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proven difficult and an analysis, “requires measurements of police activity which are generally
not publicly available” (Stone et al, 2009).
As proof of police disengaging from proactive enforcement, Mac Donald (2016) refers to
anecdotes from police officers, expressing a reluctance to proactive policing. Mac Donald
(2016) also cites concern from the “Major Cities Chiefs Association in August 2015 [where]
homicides we up 76 percent in Milwaukee, 60 percent in St. Louis and 56 percent in Baltimore
for the year…compared with the same period in 2014” (p. 65). In law enforcement, disengaging
from the public makes the job of policing more difficult for other officers. Mac Donald (2016, p.
66) references an NYPD detective explaining, “Every time we [cops] pass up on an arrest
because we don’t want a situation to blow up, we’ve only made the next cop’s job all the
harder.” The resulting disengagement can compromise public safety by creating a sense of
environmental or normative permissiveness for criminal offending.
Leveraging claims of de-policing is not without risks for researchers. Depending on the
operationalization of variables in a study, the severity of an offense disregarded or overlooked by
police, may itself constitute a crime for law enforcement. Official Misconduct is a criminal
offense, defined as knowingly committing or refraining from an act related to one’s official
functions, constituting an unauthorized exercise of their power (http://www.nycourts.gov).
Rushin and Edwards (2017) modeled two scenarios for de-policing. Their first model
posits an increase in crime as a result of the public lowering or withdrawing legitimacy for law
enforcement, in response to social media dissemination of negative video footage of policepublic interaction (Rushin & Edwards, 2017). Their second model suggests an increase in crime
as a result of police feeling a lowered sense of self-legitimacy and disengaging from the public,
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in response to social media dissemination of negative video footage of police-public interaction
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017).
Building on the concepts developed by Rushin and Edwards (2017), this author suggests
two additional models for future researchers, based on the small but growing body of literature
on the Ferguson Effect, de-policing, and self-legitimacy. Model three suggests a generalized
increased in police scrutiny from the public, triggering de-policing, and a subsequent increase in
crime. Model four acknowledges the subsequent rush to enact new or revised
policies/regulations in response to negative or unpopular police practices, triggering de-policing,
and a subsequent increase in crime.
Self-legitimacy Shaping Police Authority
In recent years, the study of police behavior has centered around assessing what officers
think of themselves, under what circumstances will that assessment change, and how lasting is
the change. Nix and Wolfe (2015) claim that the Ferguson Effect is not limited to measuring
increases and decreases in crime but include law enforcement’s perception of their own
legitimacy (i.e., self-legitimacy). Officers are less apt to engage in community partnerships if
they view themselves as illegitimate or if they feel the communities they serve view them as
illegitimate (Wolfe & Nix, 2016a).
This study examines law enforcement behavior by operating from the presumption that
“…sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect can be viewed as a negative work-related outcome for
officers, their supervisors and agencies, and the communities they serve” (Nix & Wolfe, 2016).
Research indicates officers who felt less motivated as a result of negative publicity expressed a
reduced sense of self-legitimacy (i.e., self-worth). However, the degree to which officers felt
their job had become more dangerous as a result of negative publicity was not significantly

18
related to self-legitimacy (Nix & Wolfe, 2015). Negative public sentiment failing to trigger an
increased sense of police vulnerability or compromised officer safety while on patrol is
important in preventing false notions of police-community polarization and miscommunication.
A degradation of perceived legitimacy (from the public) and self-legitimacy (by police)
in law enforcement, perpetuated on social media, alleging continued racial profiling, and abusive
militarized policing may erode citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy (Tyler, 1990; Wolfe &
Nix, 2016c). When the public no longer views police as a legitimate authority representing
government, the public are less likely to follow police orders or the law (Tyler & Huo, 2002).
Nix and Wolfe (2016) surveyed sheriffs (post-Ferguson) and found law enforcement
officers will tolerate varying degrees of public discontent with officer’s job performance and
challenges to legitimacy, when law enforcement perceive their bosses/supervisors as fair. Nix
and Wolfe’s examination of police behavior is an application of Organizational Justice Theory,
which comes from business management studies. Nix and Wolfe’s application of Organizational
Justice Theory posits, just as familial support gets people through difficulties and challenges, so
can institutional support (through supervisors and leaders) protect officers from perceiving
greater danger from the public. For example, recent studies suggest that officers with a greater
sense of self-legitimacy are more committed to their organization (Tankebe, 2010), more likely
to embrace the concepts of procedural justice (Bradford & Quinton, 2014), and less quick to
threaten citizens with force (Tankebe & Meško, 2015).
Legitimacy and Gender: Relevance of Intersectionality in Policing
Self-legitimacy is shaped by the public, but it is also shaped within policy departments, by
the policies, atmosphere, tolerances, and informal rules that exist in each agency. Pew’s 2017
study found that the experiences of Black officers differed from their Caucasian, Latino, and

19
Asian counterparts. For many in American policing, there are the experiences and perceptions of
Black police officers and then there are the experiences of everyone else.
For example, Pew found 61% of Black officers feel police do not “spend enough time
diagnosing a situation before acting” (Morin, Parker, Stepler & Mercar, 2017, p. 13) and only
32% “characterize relations with blacks in their community as either excellent or good” (Morin
et al, 2017, p. 16). This differs greatly from the 60% of white and Hispanic officers who offer
positive assessments of their relations with black citizens (Morin et al, 2017, p.16).
Based on Morin et al (2017) African American law enforcement officers regularly report
feeling less represented by their departments and share a similar narrative with African American
citizens/residents that recognizes a disparate societal system based on race (Madhani, 2017;
Morin et al, 2017). There is no current research examining the intersection of race and gender
for police officer willingness to engage the public and when engaged, examine LE willingness to
extend the public discretion. Based on existing research, examining intersectionality in this study
(by combining variables race and gender) is important in identifying whether interracial group
differences exist.
Crenshaw (1989) posits that a better understanding of disparate impact on race and
gender, is to examine them as intersecting variables (i.e., intersecting oppressions). Isolating
gender or race alone (as independent variables) fails to incorporate the multiplicative impact both
social circumstances have on the individual. Intersectionality was developed from feminist
theory (Crenshaw, 1989) and helps to identify disparate impact that may normally be hidden
within traditional variables.
Past research on intersectionality explored topics such as criminal offending and
sentencing, impact of immigration law on race and gender, and differences in medical diagnoses
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and treatment for psychopathy, as they relate to criminal offending and race. For example, Bell
(2013) found young men of color created higher rates of offending (p. 103) compared to youth of
other races and genders, but the higher rate only presented itself in young adulthood, not in
younger juveniles.
While examining the intersectionality of gender, race, and psychopathy in predicting
criminal offending, researchers found Black males are two times more likely than White males to
commit violence and inmates with psychopathy or anti-social personality disorder (APD) are
almost twice as likely than white males to get arrested for crime (Baskin-Sommers, Baskin,
Sommers, & Newman, 2013). This would have been masked if gender and race were separated,
since treating gender and race as separate variables found males of either race with either APD or
psychopathy offended more than females (Baskin-Sommers et al, 2013).
Public Perception of Law Enforcement: Fearing a Militarized Police Force
Open-source news searches of police preparation in response to the Ferguson protests
showed officers in full gear, heavy vests (i.e., body armor), many shouldering military-style
carbine rifles. Of note were the many pictures and video clips of officers mounted on a gunner’s
turret atop an armored personnel carrier (Elinson & Reinhard, 2017). As a result, members of
the public expressed concern and fear of an increasingly militarized police, prior to the Ferguson
riots. It was unclear the extent of police efforts to address public concerns over the apparent
militancy in police preparation to the Ferguson protests. It may have been helpful for police to
explain why these tools were prepared for deployment at the time, but not utilized for routine
patrol. At the time, a discussion (and public reminder) on the legitimate police uses for militarystyle equipment to address terrorism, active shooters, and related incidents may have helped the
discourse.
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The police killing of people found to be unarmed and posing no actual threat is tragic.
However, when a civilian’s death is the result of intentional police malice, misconduct, or gross
police negligence, it needs to be recognized as criminal behavior. The public argues that the
militarization of police creates a more militant, up-armored mindset in police officers, which
allow mistaken or accidental killings to occur. Balko (2014) explains, when police are allowed
to up-armor their officers with the tools of war, a militarized and armored police department can
have an evolving mindset, which may eventually view the public as the enemy.
Balko (2014) is careful to posit that a militarized police narrative is not solely a publicly
driven image. Since 2014, there have been very visible attacks on police officers as well as
terrorist-related attacks here and around the world. Police officers are subject to these images,
just like any other member of the public. A 2018 report from the European Parliament, on
terrorism in the European Union explained how 62 people died in 2017 from religiously inspired
attacks (135 in 2016, 150 in 2015, and 4 in 2014).1
An officer’s sense of an evolving urban terror threat, given the number of attacks in
recent years, can lead law enforcement to develop their own internalized necessity for hypervigilance, in order to protect themselves in a dangerous world. Although the public has expressed
fear of an increasingly militarized American police, there are legitimate police safety concerns,
based on statements elicited from the terrorists themselves. In police debriefings and intercepted
communiques (unclassified of course) are statements from terrorists and radicals that were
deterred from committing large disruptive events, “because the cops were out there doing their

The report from the European Parliament entitled, “Terrorism in the EU: Terrorist attacks,
deaths, and arrests,” can be accessed at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/2018/7/story/20180703STO07125/20180703ST
O07125_en.pdf.
1

22
anti-terror thing,” referring to police heavy weapons deployments and active checkpoints,
making a successful mass casualty event unlikely (Mercado, 2013).
To address the public’s concerns over aggressive policing, dialogue between the public
and police must continue. This conversation is challenged when police feel the public has no
confidence in their legitimacy to police, have a diminished sense of professional worth, or feel
their role does not contribute to public safety. These conversations will be even more difficult to
initiate if police decide to de-police.
Evolution of military weapons and tactics in policing
Balko (2014) explains police departments began formally introducing military tactics and
equipment back when the LAPD first pioneered the practice in the 1960s with the creation of
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. Although an overwhelming number of calls today
for SWAT teams are to assist in the execution of search warrants (Balko, 2014) municipalities
like New York City use specially trained SWAT-style units on calls for emotionally disturbed
people, rescues, and large venue site-security (Civilian Complaint Review Board, 2016; New
York City Police Department, 2017).
The reason specially trained and armed police officers are deployed today to serious 911
calls, is to have immediate access to special weapons and tools, if initial attempts at de-escalation
and negotiation fail (New York City Police Department, 2017). The aim is to first utilize lessthan-lethal measures to protect life and stabilize dangerous situations, but have the availability to
deploy lethal force when necessary (New York City Police Department, 2017).
Since the September 11th attacks, SWAT-style police units are incorporated into
counterterrorism/homeland security deployment. Balko (2014) disagrees with most cases for uparmoring police, suggesting the frequency of events requiring militarized police are too
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infrequent to justify escalating public concerns, created when the public sees heavily armed
police. Ted Lewis (2011) from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security describes the
potential for terrorist activity in the U.S. as a low probability, high consequence event driving
domestic security and policing policy to the cost of billions of dollars since the 9/11 attacks.
There are community concerns that U.S. president Trump’s pro-domestic security and
pro-police platform could hurt police/community relations. Driving this perception are
statements from several police unions in the United States, stating their desire to reverse bans
from the Obama administration on police departments procuring surplus military equipment
(Elinson & Reinhard, 2017). James and Else (2014) explain that prior to the ban, LE policy to
address narcotics and terrorism gave rise to police militarization. Supplying police with militarygrade equipment is called the 1033 Program. This program “was created by Congress in the
National Defense Authorization Act for 1997…[authorizing] the Secretary of Defense to provide
material support to authorized federal and state law enforcement agencies by transferring articles
suitable for counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities. “These are drawn from Department of
Defense (DOD) stocks deemed excess to military needs” (James & Else, 2014).
Final Thoughts on the Literature
Since the Ferguson Effect is a relatively new phenomenon, the literature on this specific
topic is sparse. Nix and Wolfe (2016) observe “we know very little about what is associated
with officers’ sensitivity to such Ferguson Effect.” It is possible, arguments in favor of the
existence of the Ferguson Effect causing increases in crime “are attributed to extraneous factors
and thus spurious” (Stone et al, 2009).
The importance of de-policing and self-legitimacy are related to bilateral public-police
trust, which impacts officer safety. FBI data on the killing and assault of law enforcement
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officers shows that although killings have declined since 2014, assaults rose 5.3%. In 2017,
60,211 LE officers in the United States were assaulted. This is the highest number of assaults for
this demographic since 1994 (see Table 25, Appendix I), when there were 64,912.
Additionally, a growing U.S. population currently estimated over 324 million
(http://www.census.gov/) implores scholars to continue examining the Ferguson Effect. During
controversial police encounters, viral social media messaging, digital activism, and uninformed
public reaction may be the “new normal” in American policing. The policies and training
enacted by police administrators and politicians in response to this new normal will define the
future of police-community relations.
Applying Role Theory and Labeling Theory to Police Behavior
This study explores both Role Theory and Labeling Theory to examine police behavior
and police decision-making. Role theory comes from Sociology while Labeling Theory comes
from Criminology. Each theory is discussed extensively, supported by relevant research,
applications, and trends.
Role Theory
Role Theory and its applicability in studying police behavior developed during the 1980s
in gender studies, examining societal perceived roles and the behavior of female police. Biddle
(1986) explains Role Theory contends that the role an individual assumes reflects social norms,
contextual demands, and personal views. That role helps define an act or situation the individual
encounters, resulting in social behavior (i.e., actions).
Biddle explains, Role Theory posits “persons are members of social positions and hold
expectations for their own behaviors and those of other persons” (1986, p. 67). “Role Theory
concerns…the fact that human beings behave in ways that are different and predictable
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depending on their respective social identities and the situation” (Biddle, 1986, p. 68). Role
theory, “focuses on interactions between and among individuals, groups, societies, and economic
systems” (Dulin, 2007, p. 104). A key assumption is for police officers to be rational actors,
committed to remaining congruent with (and protective of) normative behaviors. In discussing
Role Theory, it is apropos to use the theatre metaphor, “each actor plays their role.”
The Five Perspectives of Role Theory
There are five perspectives in Role Theory: 1) Functional, 2) Symbolic Interactionist, 3)
Structural, 4) Organizational, and 5) Cognitive. The Functional approach to Role Theory was
conceptualized by anthropologist Ralph Linton whose 1936 work was adapted and formalized by
Talcott Parsons in 1951 (Biddle, 1986). Functional Role, “…focuses on the characteristic
behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable social system” (Biddle, 1986, p.
70). Here, one’s role is shaped by conforming to normative expectations that prescribe behavior.
Symbolic Interactionist perspective was developed by George Herbert Mead (1934) to
explain how one’s role is shaped by norms which act more as a broad set of imperatives allowing
flexibility for role adaptation. Structural theory focuses more on the “social environment and
less on the individual” where individuals form sets or structures and these structures form stable
organizations (Biddle, 1986, p. 73).
Organizational Role Theory argues that roles are clearly, “identified social positions
generated by normative expectations [where] norms may vary among individuals[,]…reflect[ing]
both…official demands…and…informal groups” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). Cognitive Role Theory
suggests an individual’s perceived expectations of what others expects of them, defines behavior.
I argue that Organizational Role Theory best describes police organizations because law
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enforcement agencies operate as formal organizations, “…focused on social systems that are
preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73).
Defining One’s Role
In Role Theory, scholars have disagreed on the definition of role. As cited by Biddle
(1986) role can “refer to characteristic behavior” (Biddle 1979; Burt 1982), “[designated] social
parts to be played” (Winship & Mandel, 1983) or “scripts for social conduct” (Bates & Harvey,
1975; Zurcher, 1983). It has been argued, the different definitions of role are more stylistic and
preferential than technical and does not fundamentally change the tenets of Role Theory, which
contend behavior is defined/shaped by the societal expectations of the role individuals play
(Biddle, 1986).
Researchers applying Role Theory to the study of human behavior have struggled with
the level of importance situation/context and individual personality have in shaping one’s role.
Alexander and Knight (1971) found, “moreover the social roles that an individual plays has been
shown to affect the individual’s personality” (as cited in McCall, 1982, p. 288). Meanwhile,
Endler and Magnusson (1976) felt, “personality features vary situationally and what situations
one enters is influenced by one’s personality” (as cited in McCall, 1982, p. 288).
Organizational Role Theory: Understanding role conflict
The literature suggests Role Theory is still fundamental to understanding police behavior.
Researchers are exploring police behavior through officers’ self-perceived roles by examining
self-legitimacy. Examining officers’ role in society, broadens our understanding of the societal
expectations of police as well as the internal expectations of police within their culture and
profession. Fundamental to Role Theory is understanding role conflict, role taking, role playing,
or consensus (Biddle, 1986). In using Role Theory to explain police behavior, Organizational
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Role Theory specifically seems best suited because it posits roles come from, “social systems
that are preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical” (Biddle, 1986). In that same report, Biddle
explains:
Roles in such organizations are assumed to be associated with identified social positions
and to be generated by normative expectations, but norms may vary among individuals
and may reflect both the official demands of organizations and the pressures of informal
groups. Given the multiple sources of norm, individuals are often subjected to role
conflicts in which they must contend with antithetical norms for their behavior. (p. 73)
Understanding Ferguson and Police Behavior Through Role Conflict
The rationale for using Role Theory to examine the Ferguson Effect originates with the
premise that the public pushback and indignation created from Ferguson, creates role conflict in
police, which causes some LE officers to disengage and de-police. Of the criminological and
sociological theories examined for this research, Organizational Role Theory is best suited to
examine police behavior in light of the events in Ferguson. Allen and van de Vliert (as cited in
Biddle, 1986) explain how changed or clarified expectations cause role conflict and can result in
behavior outside (or in conflict) with societal position or role expectations and this author
suspects that is what is affecting police behavior in light of the identified police cultural shift
after Ferguson.
[Problems occur] when the actor must cope with changes in social position or
expectations for the actor’s position. Such experiences typically cause strain, and the core
of the theory concerns variables that affect the actor’s choice of strategies for coping with
the situation. (p. 74)
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Sociological theory: Its application in the study of crime and criminal justice
Applying sociological theories to studies of crime is not new. For example, the use of
social ecological theories of crime was used to explain environmental/regional variation in police
behavior. However, sociological theories of criminal offending do not always sufficiently
examine the, “class-based origins of formal social control and the relative autonomy of the
police” (Miller & Bryant, 1993, p. 133). This study carefully avoids this flaw found in prior
applications of sociological theory and criminal justice topics because it includes the public as a
powerful variable by presuming (and suggesting to other researchers) that the public’s use of
social media and recording challenges Miller and Bryant’s (1993) position of the relative
autonomy of police.
Reexamining officer risk: When careers count
Earlier discussions of police behavior were shaped by examining the relative risk to
officer safety from the neighborhood (Skolnick, 1966) which researchers argue is associated with
the socioeconomic class of the community served (Axenroth, 1983; Martin & Sherman, 1986;
Niederhoffer, 1967). With crime at historic lows in cities like New York,2 it is possible that
officer safety and security is no longer dictated solely by geographically-based violent crime, but
by the general sense of reduced officer legitimacy. However, that is not the scope of this study.
Based on the literature on de-policing and officer self-legitimacy, this researcher hypothesizes
that an additional threat to officer “safety” comes from the potential of imperiling one’s career
from community challenges during tumultuous police activity.

2

New York City Police Department year-to-date, 28-day, and week-to-date crime reports are found at
www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf.
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Police role behavior and discretion: Understanding the correlation
Research by Miller and Bryant (1993) reported the police use of discretion is not random
but correlated to the social class of communities patrolled. The poorer the community the lower
the exercise of LE discretion. Mann’s 1993 report (as cited by Miller & Bryant, 1993)
acknowledged the difficulty of a general study of a discretion-based theory of police behavior is
problematic due to the potential influence of high police brutality complaints and the
disproportionate arrest rates of minorities in measuring officer behavior.
This researcher disagrees with Mann (in part) since a reliable examination of officer
discretion may be possible through officer self-reporting but no such studies were found in the
literature. This study, as a study of officer discretion, examines the previously under-realized
impact of the Internet and social media in shaping current discourse and news reporting.
Labeling Theory: Internalizing Societal Definitions
Within Criminology, Labeling Theory purports an offender’s deviant activity is labeled
by society as negative/deviant, followed by the offender evaluating the veracity of society’s
label, and if the offender agrees to accept the label (like a self-fulfilling prophecy) engages in
further delinquency/crime (Cullen, Agnew & Wilcox, 2014). Central to Labeling Theory, shame
is an effective societal tool, communicating disfavor with counter-normative behavior.
However, shaming must have a purpose to be successful. Braithwaite (1989) concluded crime is
higher when shaming stigmatizes behavior and crime is lower where shaming is reintegrative.
Shaming works when the offender is given the opportunity to re-enter society by demonstrating
normative/compliant behavior. Shaming has a greater chance of success when offenders have
multiple interdependent relationships reinforcing normative behavior.
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If we are to assume Labeling Theory is appropriately explaining police behavior rather
than their perceived role, we expect to see officers explaining in their opened-ended survey
responses that societal challenges to their legitimacy had a strong deterrent effect on police
behavior because the challenge had a shaming effect (resulting in either specific or general
deterrence).
Under Labeling Theory, you would assume that police internalize the negative label or
threat from the public and alter their behavior, as shown in cases of delinquency. In their
examination of the labeling of convicted felons and its impact on recidivism Chiricos, Barrick,
and Bales (2007) used hierarchical linear modeling to conclude, “…being adjudicated guilty as a
felon significantly and substantially increases the likelihood of recidivism within 2 years of
conviction compared to those who had the felony designation withheld” (p. 570).
Criminological theory is the pursuit of understanding deviance. Macro-level theories
deal with larger group/community/societal behavior while micro-level theories address
individual/small group behavior (Cullen et al, 2014). Labeling Theory is a macro-level theory.
This research examines police behavior and predicts the likelihood of officers’ actions rather
than exploring the severity of their decisions (e.g., discretion, misconduct, or de-policing) under
the law. Labeling Theory presents an opportunity to explore the role of the officer which was
explored by Matsueda (1992) in his longitudinal study of American youth.
Matsueda (1992) found the internal label of conformist or delinquent is a reflection of the
appraisal of others. If Matsueda’s findings can be applied to police behavior, we may see roletaking, which occurs when the subject puts themselves into the “shoes” of the person appraising
a situation (i.e., the public, in this study) and formulates options for a “line of action” (Matsueda,
1992, p. 1580). Figure 1 models Labeling Theory.
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If respondents state their decisions were based on an internal agreement with public
classifications of their behavior or worth, and act in accordance with that classification, this
would be an example of, “role-taking and usually entails taking the role of members in one’s
reference group, which is the source of one’s values and self-perception” (Matsueda, 1992, p.
1583). Who is the reference group? Is it the institution/profession of policing? Is it the
community? The answer is driven by the respondent. The limitation with applying Matsueda’s
findings to police behavior is his unit of analysis—American youth—which are heavily
influenced by their parental reference groups (Matsueda, 1992, pp. 1602-1604). Clear
extrapolations to adult behavior may not be as clear as the number and complexity of adult
relationships will differ than those of youth. Figure 1 was extrapolated from the works of
Braithwaite (2002), Becker (1963), Goffman (1963), Lemert (1951), and Cullen et al (2014).

Figure 1: Labeling Theory Diagram 3
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Graphic created by author, C. Mercado (2019).
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Methodology
Data collection was achieved by administering a 17-question electronic survey to sworn
police officers from ten police departments in the U.S. to measure enforcement decisions for
varying scenarios and differing demographics. Respondents were also asked whether their
enforcement decisions were influenced by the age of the client (i.e., apparently under 18 years
old), or the perceived racial membership of the client (i.e., member of the public). The survey
concluded by asking officers where they obtain their law enforcement news (e.g., social media,
print, broadcast news, union notices, etc.) and whether negative news stories involving U.S. law
enforcement affect their enforcement decisions.
Survey Design
The survey was administered through Survey Monkey. No personal or identifying
information was recorded from respondents. Survey questions were a combination of Likert
scale and categorical responses in addition to open-ended (i.e., respondent fill-in) responses.
This survey tool draws on both quantitative and qualitative assumptions and design, using a
cross-sectional survey research design, collecting data through a questionnaire (Appendix B).
Vignettes
Respondents were presented with six scenarios (in the form of vignettes). These six
vignettes represent the typical interactions police have with the public. The first three scenarios
are: 1) Quality-of-life offense (e.g., loud radio, public drinking, or playing loud music), 2) People
fighting in the street, and 3) Traffic stop for a minor vehicle infraction. The next three scenarios
are similar, except each one introduces a different challenge to officers’ authority: 1) Active cell
phone recording of the officer’s interactions, 2) Verbal challenges to police authority, and 3)
Passive challenges (i.e., manually but silently documenting/writing down the interaction).
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At no time are the officers in the scenario physically impeded from doing their job. None
of the officers in the scenario were physically injured. For the scenarios, the officers are in full
patrol uniform (bullet resistant vest, gun, radio, hat, etcetera) and driving a marked police car.
There is no doubt or ambiguity to the public detailed in the scenarios that the public is interacting
with sworn law enforcement officers.
Using vignettes in survey instruments
This researcher’s survey tool incorporated several data collection techniques. In addition
to pre-coded and scaled responses, this study also used vignettes which are short descriptive
literary sketches (https://www.merriam-webster.com). These vignettes use both fixed-choice and
open-ended responses. Finch (1987) explains vignettes are desirable survey tools because they
allow for researcher specified context to answer questions about respondent preferences and
behavior. “[T]he respondent is being invited to make normative statements about a set of social
circumstances, rather than to express his or her ‘beliefs’ or ‘values’ in a vacuum” (Finch, 1987,
p. 106). Vignettes free the respondent from a fixed selection of choices (none of which may
match their opinions/feelings) by providing the contextual framework of a story, without the
seemingly directionless invitation offered from solely open-ended questions.
Vignettes were successfully used to test environmental theory and police decision making
(Phillips & Sobol, 2012) in four police agencies located in New York State, by examining officer
willingness to make traffic stops. The researchers in the Phillips and Sobol study argued that
employing vignettes are a stronger indicator of determinacy than agency-reported data because,
“[t]he vignette research design…allows for the inclusion of multiple variables and can control
for those cases where a person is not stopped by officers” (Phillips & Sobol, 2012, p. 555). The
research variables in Philips and Sobol’s study were embedded in the vignettes (demonstrating
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the utility of vignettes) which, “possess aspects of a controlled, random experiment and,
therefore, provide a benefit in studying the judgement of police officers in traffic stop incidents:
[as well as] collecting data on vehicles not stopped” (Phillips & Sobol, 2012, p. 557).
Limitations of using vignettes
There are limitations with using vignettes. Researchers need to ensure the stories in the
survey are not needlessly complex but sufficiently descriptive so each respondent is clearly
responding to the same scenario. Finch (1987) cautions researchers using vignettes to make
characters believable and understand the difference in asking respondents “What should [a third
party] do?” versus “What would you do?” since these similar questions can elicit different
responses from people. Since this researcher examined normative law enforcement behavior, his
survey asked respondents to explain what “they” would do.
Data Entry, Data Management, and Coding Responses
This researcher was the sole coder for entering data into Stata in this study as well as
categorizing and classifying respondent’s open-text responses for the scenarios (Appendix J),
enforcement actions with teenagers (Appendix K), and enforcement with minority community
members (Appendix L). The methodology for coding required this researcher to read all
responses provided and group those written responses based on common answers (creating
categories). Open-field responses for the scenarios, teen enforcement, and minority enforcement
followed questions asking respondents to explain their reason for taking (or not taking)
enforcement action. Some respondents chose not to provide an answer for their enforcement
decisions and their blank responses were coded accordingly.
Single coder entry by this researcher may raise concerns of interpretation error or
confirmation bias in grouping and categorizing respondents’ answers. This researcher disagrees
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and posits that training people to perform data entry (i.e., multiple coders) in these types of
studies has greater potentiality for error since the respondents in this study tended to be older,
married, supervisors in law enforcement, which mirrored the researcher’s demographic
classification. Respondents’ answers in this study, literary timbre, and written vernacular will
probably differ from that of a teenager or young adult. There may also be vocational and
generational differences in how respondents may answer an open-field question (i.e., word
choices) that may result in interpretation error by someone performing data entry from a different
demographic. This could lead to interpretation bias on the part of the data coder and would
require adequate training by this researcher to ensure consistent and accurate translation of
respondents’ answers to one of the identified response categories.
This dataset consists of 792 respondents which proved to be very manageable for this
researcher. Single coding also provided a mechanism for overall accountability, demonstrated
researcher ethics, and ensured data integrity in this research project. To assume future
researchers replicating this study would arrive at the exact same open-field coding classifications
as this researcher would be hubristic. However, using a single coder does provide a level of endpoint accountability in data management. This researcher has over two decades of experience in
law enforcement, which permits a level of familiarity with the vernacular and word-choice used
in policing that a person from a different demographic, outside the profession, performing data
entry, may find challenging.
Population and Sampling Strategy
According to the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008
(https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf) most LE agencies in the U.S. are small local
departments, with only a few dozen to a few hundred sworn uniform officers or sheriff’s
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deputies. That same DOJ report explains, of the 765,000 sworn LE officers in the U.S., 60%
come from local departments consisting of one hundred or more.
This study relies on convenience sampling in administering its surveys. With smaller
police agencies, it is difficult to ensure a statistically valid probability-based sample.
Convenience sampling is a non-probability-based method, essentially composed of easy to reach
respondents returning surveys. Convenience sampling is useful in identifying trends from
collected data on populations difficult to survey or identify. A key limitation to convenience
sampling and other types of purposive or judgmental sampling (i.e., samples drawn from the
researcher’s own knowledge of the population) is the lack of random selection in sampling
(Maxfield & Babbie, 2015, p. 213). Properly selected random sampling is representative of the
greater population under examination and allows researchers to generalize from the sample to the
unobserved population (Maxfield & Babbie, 2015, pp. 202-206).
Limitations with sampling methodology
Most police departments (PD) in the United States are smaller agencies ranging from a
few dozen to a few hundred officers, highly localized, patrolling populations fewer than 500,000
people. Larger departments like Chicago PD, Boston PD, Los Angeles APD, Philadelphia PD,
and New York City PD are often sought for research partnerships and data collection, given the
potential sample size for officers, as well as resident population. This research project affords
smaller departments the opportunity to help contribute to emerging law enforcement policy by
surveying their officers.
This analysis is also limited by its post-test design. This study surveys current police
responses for their self-reporting willingness to engage the public. This study does not measure
pre-Ferguson police attitudes of engagement to post-Ferguson police attitudes for engagement
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because the hiring of some officers during or after the events of Ferguson make measurement of
pre-Ferguson police attitudes moot.
Replicating this study under different conditions
Future researchers may decide to repeat this analysis as a longitudinal study to ascertain
changes in police responses—as a function of days between controversial, viral, or public video
depicting controversial police uses of force. As a comparison to this study, a similar survey can
be issued to the public with the unit of analysis as citizens, rather than police officers. A key
challenge to the proposed longitudinal study would be maintaining anonymity as the same
officers would need to be surveyed at designated points in the study. Wu, Liu, Gandermann, and
Zumbo (2010, p. 123) also identified four methodological challenges in longitudinal studies
using multilevel growth models: 1) dealing with changing measures over time, 2) modeling
residual dependence due to nested data, 3) modeling observed trajectories, and 4) deciding which
predictors are more important in explaining change over time.
Research Hypotheses
The three research hypotheses for this research project are:


H1: The introduction of a cell phone in a manner indicative of recording video
footage will cause some officers to disengage and decide not to arrest/summons a
subject.



H2: The defined role of the officer as crime fighter will have a greater likelihood
of arresting/summonsing the citizen/resident.



H3: African-American officers will be more likely to exercise discretion in
scenarios where they are challenged by the public.
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The hypotheses used in this study comes from the literature on policing, police culture (as
it relates to enforcement), community engagement, the Ferguson Effect, de-policing, and selflegitimacy. H1 was formulated from the literature where several examples found the introduction
of a cell phone camera was associated with no enforcement from the officers. In some examples,
the officers were seemingly chased away by taunting, hostile crowds (Mullins, 2018). These
events were publicly available on social media shortly after they occurred (Mullins, 2018).
H2 has its origins in the mission statements and credos of countless police departments in
the U.S. which state that their primary mission (i.e., their principal defined role) is to fight crime
and enforce the law. The presumption is that those officers who envision their role as crime
fighter will have a greater likelihood of arresting/summonsing the citizen/resident. H3 comes
from the work by Morin et al (2017) in their study for PEW that found the experiences of
African-American officers differ from their Caucasian, Hispanic, and Asian counterparts. Morin
et al argue that for many African-American police officers there are two police departments: one
African-American—which usually represents a small number of officers—and one that is not
African-American. Culturally, many African-American officers find there operational and
contextual interpretation of policing more in line with (and sympathetic to) minority
communities as recipients of police policies compared to non-African American officers who
view themselves (as a cohesive group), administering police services to the public.
Operationalization of Primary Variables
Variable operationalization in this study comes from the literature on Role Theory and
the characteristics that define one’s role as well as an analysis of the types of challenges and
attacks officers experienced post-Ferguson (i.e., self-initiated enforcement, responding to 911
call, and public venue events). Physical challenges are not considered in this research model
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because citizen contact with law enforcement while officers are taking enforcement action can
constitute some degree of obstruction of governmental authority, subjecting the citizen to arrest.
This study attempts to ascertain if officers are willing to make arrests, based on their selfperceived role, even when challenged.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (yes/no) chosen by the respondent to
indicate their willingness or likelihood to affect an arrest based on the vignette, the race of the
citizen, or the age of the citizen. The introduction of a mediating variable for body worn
cameras (BWC) is an important variable. Legitimacy and transparency (by leveraging
technology) were specific hallmarks for the U.S. President’s taskforce on 21st Century Policing
(see Table 24, Appendix H).
Independent variables
The independent variables are comprised of personal and contextual characteristics. They
are discrete categorical selections. For personal characteristics, age is a categorical selection in
five-year increments from 21 through 62 and older. Race/ethnicity is a categorical selection with
six choices. Education offers seven discrete categorical responses for the highest grade
completed. Gender contains three categories. Family status is a discrete selection from five
options examining single (never married and widowed), married (including married but
separated), or divorced.
For contextual characteristics, rank includes six choices, designed to capture the discrete
categories based on several law enforcement agencies in the northeastern United States from
entry-level sworn officer through senior executive. Tenure is a measure of seniority (in 4-year
increments), represented by eight categories from new academy graduates through veterans with
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36 years or more. Job assignment offers four choices, based on daily assignment. Role is a selfdefined characteristic captured by five choices.
Limitations in variable selection
Missing from these models is a variable for officer workload. When examining an
officer’s decision whether to take police action/engage the public, it would help to understand
just how busy that officer or sector car team really is. There are different ways to measure this
but each has its own limitations. Self-reporting officer workload (number of calls for service) is
possible, however, it is probably more accurate to use official department data by either querying
that agency’s dispatch reports or their 911 call center.
Agencies like the New York City Police Department (NYPD) require patrol officers and
detective investigators to submit monthly performance reports (i.e., activity reports) to account
for their productivity and performance. Unfortunately, patrol officers and field investigators
account for about half of many departments as the other half are involved in staffing and support
related functions (e.g., logistics, analysis, supply, procurement, maintenance, information
technology, and etcetera).
Some departments use two-person sector car teams while others use solo patrol. Not
mentioned in the literature is an analysis of an officer’s willingness to be proactive (even
aggressive with order maintenance) as a function of the proximity and response time for the
arrival of backup officers when called. The difficulty for researchers attempting to
operationalize workload for comparison across police agencies, comes from controlling for the
severity of calls (felony, misdemeanor, crimes in progress, low-level requests for service,
etcetera) and the duration spent on each type of call. While examining just traffic stops, Phillips
and Sobel (2012) stated, “…no study has included a workload variable in their analysis” (p. 553).
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Ethical Considerations
Despite earnest data encryption efforts and anonymous surveys, this study does have
vulnerabilities. In the event a respondent’s comments can be attributed back to the subject, some
responses may have a deleterious impact on the officer’s relationship with peers, superiors, and
their department. To guard against this, the surveys were digitally and anonymously
disseminated through SurveyMonkey. Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were not collected or
stored from respondents. This feature is part of the standard security requests offered by
SurveyMonkey. Each digital survey is preceded by an informed consent prompt.
For the purposes of protecting respondents’ anonymity, digital survey administration is
far more advantageous than paper surveys. Paper surveys present a greater potential for physical
breech of anonymity. Distinctive penmanship, word choice, or writing style can also betray
anonymity if paper surveys are somehow compromised.
Data Analysis
The dataset for this analysis consists of seven hundred and ninety-two law enforcement
officers from 10 police agencies. Most of the agencies are small to medium size departments.
Six of the agencies have a headcount of less than 160 sworn officers. Three of the agencies are
more than 160 sworn, but less than 500. The largest of the agencies in this study (with several
thousand sworn officers) is located in the eastern United States and were invited to participate
through their labor unions.
Since most of the departments in this study are small, none of them are identified. This
further protects the anonymity of their respondents. Instead, the sample was bifurcated into east
coast and west coast U.S. police agencies, due to their general proximity to either of the nation’s
coasts. Most respondents (n=711) represent east coast agencies (see Table 1).

42
Table 1: Overview of Officers from Participating Departments—5 States, 10 Agencies
Coastal Designation
East Coast (3 states, 5 agencies)
West Coast (2 states, 5 agencies)
Totals

Frequency
(N=792)
711
81
792

Percentage
90%
10%
100%

Initially, there were 840 survey respondents. However, 48 cases were removed from the
analysis because most of the data for these responses were either incomplete or missing. The
average respondent completed the 17-question survey in approximately 13 minutes.
Descriptive statistics
The independent variables selected in this study testing law enforcement behavior were
modeled after prior studies examining Role Theory and policing (Paez, 2016). Role Theory
researchers categorized rank, assignment (job), role, experience, and location (where assigned)
as contextual variables. Contextual variables are those traits that can change under different
environments, communities, or conditions. Table 2 contains an overview of the contextual
independent variables in this study. The typical respondent in this study is described as having
the contextual traits of supervisory rank (79%, n=622), with a job assignment working in
patrol/field operations (71%, n=556). Their tenure is between 11-15 years on the job (30%,
n=237), with the self-defined role of problem solver (42%, n=331) and unlikely to wear a body
camera or have one in their police cars (55%, n=435).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics—Contextual Characteristics
Independent Variables
Rank (N=789)
Supervisory
Non-supervisory
Assignment (N=788)
Field Operations
Staff & Support
Training
Quality Control
Tenure (N=792)
New graduate-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30 years
31-35 years
36 years or more
Role (N=789)
Safety Expert
Crime Fighter
Problem Solver
First Responder
Peacekeeper
Body Worn Camera (N=785)
Wear a body camera
Vehicle-mounted camera
Both body and car cameras
No cameras of either type

Frequency (n)

Percentage

622
167

79%
21%

556
156
25
51

71%
20%
3%
6%

54
91
237
165
138
59
35
13

7%
11%
30%
21%
17%
7%
4%
2%

14
229
331
150
65

2%
29%
42%
19%
8%

251
44
55
435

32%
6%
7%
55%

Variables capturing age, race, education, marital status, and gender, measure personal
characteristics and describe those traits originating with a specific person. Table 3 contains an
overview of the personal characteristic independent variables in this study. The typical
respondent has the personal traits of male (91%, n=715), white (72%, n=553), between 30-39
years old (39%, n=306), with a baccalaureate degree (54%, n=429), and married (76%, n=599).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics—Personal Characteristics
Independent Variables
Gender (N=789)
Male
Female
Non-binary
Age (N=789)
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-over
Education (N=791)
H.S. diploma
H.S. diploma +credits
Associate
Baccalaureate
Master
Law degree
Doctorate
Family Status (N=792)
Single, never married
Married
Married but separated
Divorced
Widowed
Race (N=767)
Black
White
Hispanic
Asian
American Indian
Other

Frequency (n)

Percentage

715
70
4

91%
9%
.5%

38
306
278
167

5%
39%
35%
21%

2
117
116
429
119
6
2

.3%
15%
15%
54%
15%
.8%
.3%

116
599
14
56
7

15%
76%
2%
7%
.9%

49
553
98
44
6
17

6%
72%
13%
6%
.8%
2%

Correlations between independent variables
“Correlation is a bivariate analysis that measures the strength of association between two
variables and the direction of the relationship” (www.statisticssolutions.com). This analysis uses
Spearman’s Rho (rs)—a non-parametric test—to evaluate correlation because this dataset
contains ordinal, interval, or ratio variables that are monotonically related, making Spearman’s
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Rho an appropriate analysis over other correlations such as Pearson.4 Correlation results are
summarized in Table 4.5
“In an ordinal scale, the levels of a variable are ordered such that one level can be
considered higher/lower than another. However, the magnitude of the difference between levels
is not necessarily known” (https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendallspearman/). Examples of ordinal levels for variables in this dataset are education, rank, and
marital status where we know one category is higher or differentiated from another, but it is not
immediate that each category classification has the same difference or interval of measure
between them (https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendall-spearman/).
Monotonic is defined as, “having the property either of never increasing or never
decreasing as the values of the independent variable or the subscripts of the terms increase”
(www.merriam-webster.com).6 A Pearson r correlation is not appropriate for this dataset because
Pearson is used to describe linear relationships, for normally distributed data that is
homoscedastic.7
When interpreting Spearman’s Rho, the coefficient can range between positive and
negative one (-1 ≤ rs ≤ 1).8 The closer Spearman’s Rho is to positive or negative one, the
stronger the monotonic relationship.9 Very weak relationships will have an associated Rho of
.00-.19, a moderate association is found at .40-.59, and a very strong relationship is .80-1.0.10

4

An explanation of the rules for using correlation in statistical analysis is provide by Statistics Solutions,
Inc. and can be accessed at https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendall-spearman/.
5
Instructions and tutorials on computing and interpreting Spearman’s Correlation using STATA can be
accessed at https://statistics/laerd.com/stata-tutorials/spearmans-correlation-using-stata.php.
6
For a definition of monotonic, see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/monotonic.
7
See https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendall-spearman/.
8
A discussion on interpreting Spearman’s Rho is found at
www.statstutor.ac.uk/resources/uploaded/spearmans.pdf.
9

Ibid.
Ibid.

10
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Rank was weakly correlated to Assignment (rs=0.2388, p=0.000), Gender (rs=0.1378,
p=0.0002), Age (rs=0.3033, p=0.000), Education (rs=-0.0919, p=0.0416), Family Status
(rs=0.1293, p=0.0006), GendRace (rs=0.0910, p=0.0156), Role (rs=-0.0862, p=0.0221), and
BWC (rs=0.2964, p=0.000). Assignment was weakly correlated to Age (rs=0.0847, p=0.0245),
Tenure (rs=0.1716, p=0.000), Role (rs=0.0914, p=0.0151), and BWC (rs=0.2250, p=0.000).
Gender was weakly correlated to Education (rs=-0.1359, p=0.0003) and Family Status
(rs=0.0798, p=0.0342). Age was weakly correlated to Education (rs=-0.1195, p=0.0015), Family
Status (rs=0.3047, p=0.000), Race (rs=-0.1052, p=0.0052), and BWC (rs=0.3617, p=0.000).
Education was weakly correlated to Tenure (rs=-0.1179, p=0.0017), Race (rs=-0.0869,
p=0.0210), GendRace (rs=-0.1366, p=0.0003), Role (rs=0.0741, p=0.0491), and BWC (rs=0.1278, p=0.0007). Tenure is weakly correlated to Family Status (rs=0.3073, p=0.000) and Race
(rs=-0.0855, p=0.0233). Family Status was weakly correlated to BWC (rs=0.1340, p=0.000).
Few variables were either moderately or strongly correlated. Rank was moderately
correlated to Tenure (rs=0.4544, p=0.000). Age was strongly correlated to Tenure (rs=0.7941,
p=0.000). Tenure was moderately correlated to BWC (rs=0.4079, p=0.000). As expected, Gender
and Race were moderately (rs=0.5146, p=0.000) and highly (rs=0.8910, p=0.000) correlated to
GendRace (respectively) as the latter was derived by combining the former.
Multicollinearity
This study’s six scenarios and other research questions modeled to examine teen
enforcement, minority enforcement, defined role, and negative law enforcement news were
examined for multicollinearity. After each logistic regression, a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
was conducted using STATA command vif, uncentered. A VIF of 10 or more is an indicator that
the identified variable is probably mirroring the measurement of another independent variable
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which can skew coefficients, and impact the analysis (Williams, 2015, p. 5). Across the models
in this study, some of the subcategories had VIF values of 10 or more. However, removing them
from the dataset would greatly impact the analytical value necessary to explain respondent
membership in the binary dependent variable.
Some remedies for multicollinearity involve removing the variables with VIF values of
10 or more, then re-running the regression analysis and VIF testing, until the resulting model has
VIF values for each independent value less than ten (Williams, 2015). Another option is to select
a different analysis. The University of California’s (UCLA) Institute for Digital Research and
Education (2019) recognizes that the statistical model undergoing testing may require all
independent variables for that model to remain. This researcher takes UCLA’s position for this
study and retained the independent variables in each model because Role Theory posits both
personal and contextual characteristics influence behavior.

Table 4: Spearman’s Correlation for Independent Variables

Rank
Assign.
Gender
Age
Educat
Tenure
FamStat
Race
GenRace
Role
BWC

Rank
1.0

Assign.

0.2388
0.000
0.1378
0.0002
0.3033
0.0000
-0.0919
0.0146
0.4544
0.0000
0.1293
0.0006
0.0330
0.3822
0.0910
0.0156
-0.0862
0.0221
0.2964
0.0000

1.0

Gender

-0.0736
0.0508

1.0

0.0847
0.0245
0.0357
0.3441
0.1716
0.0000
0.0222
0.5567
-0.0100
0.7904
-0.0414
0.2719
0.0914
0.0151
0.2250
0.0000

0.0383
0.3099
-0.1359
0.0003
0.0443
0.2396
0.0798
0.0342
0.0692
0.0661
0.5146
0.0000
-0.0443
0.2400
-0.0145
0.7001

Age

Educat

Tenure

FamStat

Race

GenRace

Role

BWC

Key
Rho (rs)
Sig. Level
1.0
-0.1195
0.0015
0.7941
0.0000
0.3047
0.0000
-0.1052
0.0052
-0.0731
0.0523
-0.0187
0.6204
0.3617
0.0000

1.0
-0.1179
0.0017
-0.0625
0.0973
-0.0869
0.0210
-0.1366
0.0003
0.0741
0.0491
-0.1278
0.0007

1.0
0.3073
0.0000
-0.0855
0.0233
-0.0535
0.1556
-0.0498
0.1870
0.4079
0.0000

Note: Statistical significance is p < 0.05, with significant correlations noted in bold.

1.0
-0.0257
0.4962
0.0142
0.7070
-0.0294
0.4357
0.1340
0.0000

1.0
0.8910
0.0000
-0.0165
0.6618
-0.0109
0.7729

1.0
-0.0342
0.3644
-0.0161
0.6693

1.0
-0.0439
0.2440

1.0
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Conceptual Model and Statistical Methods Overview
Since the dependent variable (i.e., outcome or response variable) is dichotomous, logistic
regression is used to measure the relationship between the independent variables (i.e., predictor
or explanatory variables) and the dependent variable. Logistic regression is non-parametric,
therefore it is not restricted by the same liner regression requirements of normal distribution or
sample size. Criteria for logistic regression mandate each independent variable have a minimum
of 10 cases with an overall sample size equal to or greater than 100 cases (Fitzgerald &
Fitzgerald, 2014).
Ordinal logistic regression would have been appropriate if the dependent variable had a
discrete order for membership. Multinomial logistic regression would have been appropriate if
the dependent variable had three or more categories of no particular order. Neither of the
aforementioned regression models are appropriate here. Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald (2014, p. 440)
explain the logistic regression equation used for this analysis is Logit (Y)= A + B1X1 + B2X2 +
B3X3 + B4X4 + B5X5 + … +error. Logit (Y) represents the dependent variable. B1, B2, B3… each
represent the average amount of change per independent variable (denoted by the subscript
numbers for each BiXi combination). STATA/MP 15.1, from StataCorp, was the statistical
software package used to compute the equations in this analysis.
Six scenarios were analyzed. The first three establish a baseline for law enforcement
behavior, because they do not include challenges to the officer: 1) Low-level, quality of life
offense, 2) Two adults fighting in the street, and 3) Car stop for a traffic infraction. The next
three scenarios include a non-physical challenge to the officer’s authority: 4) Street fight with
public cell phone recording, 5) Two non-compliant protestors with verbal challenges to officer
legitimacy, and 6) Car stop with written documentation made of the officer’s information and
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incident. Respondents had the binary choice of either taking law enforcement action (coded as
1) or not taking law enforcement action (coded as 0). This is how discretion was measured in
this study. Each logistic regression underwent Estat classification sensitivity testing for
goodness of model fit (www.stata.com). After executing logistic regression commands for both
the experimental models (i.e., containing both dependent and independent variables) and null
models (i.e., using just the dependent variable), the Estat classification was executed to
determine the predictive quality of the model for both the null model and experimental model.
Although the literature varies on an appropriate threshold for improvement above the null, an
improvement of 25% or more for the experimental model is considered sufficient. Table 5 is a
summary for all findings in this study.

Table 5: Summary Table of Findings
Scenario /
Question
S1. Low-level offense
S2. Street Fight
S3. Car Stop
S4. Cell phone Challenge
S5. Verbal Challenge
S6. Passive Challenge
Q: Minorities
Q: Teenagers
Q: Neg. Law Enf. News
Q: Neg. Public Label
Q: Role in Public Safe
Intersectionality
S1. Low-level offense
S2. Street Fight
S3. Car Stop
S4. Cell phone challenge
S5. Verbal Challenge
S6. Passive Challenge
Q: Minorities
Q: Teenagers
Q: Neg. Law Enf. News
Q: Neg. Public Label
Q: Role in Public Safe

Dep. Var.
Significant Independent Variables
Rank, Assign, Gender, Age, Educat., Tenure, Fam. Status, Race, Role
(Yes/No)
Enforcement
Rank
Enforcement
Rank and Tenure
Enforcement
No predictors significant
Enforcement
Rank and Family Status
Enforcement
Rank and Family Status
Enforcement
Rank, Assignment, and Education
Discretion
No predictors significant
Enforcement
Age and Tenure
Affected
Tenure
Labeling
Age, Family Status, and Race
Important
Rank, Age, Tenure, Gender, and Role
Rank, Assign, Age, Educat., Tenure, Fam. Status, GendRace, Role
Enforcement
Rank
Enforcement
Rank, Tenure, GenRace
Enforcement
No predictors significant
Enforcement
Race and Family Status
Enforcement
Rank and Family Status
Enforcement
Rank, Assignment, and Education
Discretion
No predictors significant
Enforcement
Assignment, Age, and Tenure
Affected
Tenure, Family Status, and GendRace
Labeling
Education
Important
Rank, Age, Tenure, and Defined Role

Overall (p)
Yes
No
-0.2208
-0.2575
-0.7636
0.0058
-0.0443
-0.0327
--0.7117
-0.1367
-0.1972
0.0364
-0.0232
----0.0034
-0.0082
------

0.2079
0.1836
0.6739
-0.0633
-0.5211
0.0753
0.3363
0.1414
0.0555
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Overview of Statistical Testing Results
Table 6 provides an overview of all six scenarios. The first three scenarios establish a
baseline for law enforcement officers taking enforcement action, for essentially routine
interactions with the public. They are not statistically significant. The last three scenarios
incorporate a public challenge to the police officer. These models demonstrate statistical
significance. What follows is an overview of each scenario and its findings.
Table 6: Synopsis of Logistic Regression Results—All Six Scenarios
Scenario

Obs.

LR X2 (df)

Prob.

S1: Low-level Offense
594
38.91 (33)
0.2208
S2: Fighting in Street
595
38.93 (34)
0.2575
S3: Car Stop
594
27.82 (34)
0.7636
S4: Cell phone Challenge
589
57.07 (33)
0.0058
S5: Verbal Challenge
592
48.00 (33)
0.0443
S6: Passive Challenge
592
48.23 (32)
0.0327
Note: Shaded scenarios are statistically significant.

Pseud.
R2
0.0486
0.0600
0.0339
0.0728
0.0443
0.0765

Estat
Null
58.95%
76.32%
54.25%
62.22%
61.06%
78.12%

Estat
Model
63.80%
76.13%
59.60%
63.50%
64.36%
77.53%

Table 7 compares enforcement decision results for each scenario. For low-level offenses
(i.e., not requiring mandatory arrest) and fighting in the street, most law enforcement personnel
would not take enforcement action. However, enforcement action is likely for a routine car stop.
Challenging an officer with a cell phone recording would most likely not result in enforcement
action. However, enforcement action was likely when the public verbally challenged officers or
passively challenged them (e.g., note taking, documenting the incident with the officer).
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Table 7: Enforcement Decision Results—All Six Scenarios
Scenario

Would Take Enforcement
Would Not Take
Action (Yes)
Enforcement Action (No)
Frequency
Percentage
Frequency
Percentage
S1: Low-level Offense
257
41.05%
369
58.95%
S2: Fighting in Street
148
23.68%
477
76.32%
S3: Car Stop
338
54.25%
285
45.75%
S4: Cell phone Challenge
235
37.78%
387
62.22%
S5: Verbal Challenge
381
61.06%
243
38.94%
S6: Passive Challenge
489
78.12%
137
21.88%
Note: Shaded cells denote the majority decision for each scenario.
Scenario 1 Results
Scenario 1 presented law enforcement officers with a low-level offense impacting
residents’ quality-of-life (e.g., drinking in public, playing loud music, or similar infraction). The
offense may be correctable with enforcement action, by either an arrest or summons. The officer
may also choose to exercise discretion, and not take any enforcement action. Table 8 details the
statistically significant independent variables.
Table 8: Scenario 1, Logistic Regression Results for Car Stop
S1: Car Stop
(N=594)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education

Odds Ratio

Prob.

2.1792

0.008

.7699
.5763
1.4539

0.274
0.299
0.291

.8258
1.3641

0.556
0.812

1.1233
1.4149
1.1274

0.842
0.583
0.858
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High School
Omitted
H.S. +credits
1.2125
0.842
AA/AS
1.7371
0.563
BA/BA
1.5091
0.659
MA/MS
2.037
0.453
JD
Omitted
PhD/EdD
Omitted
Tenure
6-10
.8773
0.807
11-15
.7133
0.542
16-20
.4320
0.170
21-25
.4052
0.159
26-30
4688
0.288
31-35
.4113
0.247
36+
.2762
0.178
Family Status
Married
.7864
0.398
Separated
.6009
0.521
Divorced
.8879
0.781
Widowed
.2623
0.282
Race
White
.9906
0.980
Hispanic
1.260
0.594
Asian/PacIs
2.629
0.067
AmerInd
2.629
0.067
Other
2.988
0.107
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
1.157
0.853
Problem Solver
1.269
0.761
First Responder
1.204
0.816
Peacekeeper
1.049
0.954
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 1 measured the likelihood (i.e., odds ratio) of
taking enforcement action for a low-level offense, for predictor variables: rank, age, race,
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status. Three hundred and sixty-nine (58.95%)
did not take enforcement action and 257 (41.05%) did. Supervisors are two times more likely to
take enforcement action when dealing with low-level offenses compared to non-supervisors.
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Officer’s responses for Scenario 1
In Scenario 1 (N=626), 59% (n=369) elected not to take enforcement action. For those
officers not taking enforcement action, 34% (n=187) stated in their open-field responses they
would: prefer to use discretion, act only if they were addressing a chronic condition, act if the
person is willing to cease and desist, or would not take enforcement action for this scenario.
Table 9 details the top answers respondents provided for not taking enforcement action. See
Appendix J for an overview of the types of reasons respondents supplied for each scenario.
Table 9: Top Responses for No Enforcement (Scenario 1)
Response

Frequency

Percentage

Prefer discretion

187

34%

Prefer warn and admonish

68

13%

Anti-cop climate

53

8%

Offense too petty

21

4%

For Scenario 1, 41% elected to take enforcement action. For those taking enforcement
action 24% (n=133) responded they did so because: they receive a paycheck to enforce the law,
need to discourage poor behavior, or doing nothing sends the wrong message. Others stated
enforcement was based on Broken Windows—the theory that enforcing lower-level offenses
creates an inhospitable environment for more serious offending (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). A
remaining 15% (n=82) would take enforcement action, but qualified their choice by stating: “It
depends on the circumstances, I would also consider discretion, or Use enforcement to correct
negative behavior.”
Scenario 2 Results
Scenario 2 involves two adults fighting in the street over the final score of a
sporting event. There are no injuries and bystanders are in the area, observing how the officer
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resolves this interaction. No one is challenging or interfering with the officer. The offense may
be correctable with either an arrest or summons. The officer may also choose to exercise
discretion, and not take any enforcement action. Table 10 details the statistically significant
independent variables.
Table 10: Scenario 2, Logistic Regression Results for Fighting in the Street
S2: Fighting
(N=595)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30
31-35
36+
Family Status
Married

Odds Ratio

Prob.

2.3481

0.018

1.0683
1.024
.9061

0.809
0.966
0.814

1.2527
3.4867

0.577
0.360

2.4494
3.3449
2.7824

0.185
0.099
0.182

.38335
.8464
.5888
.5561
2.1430
Omitted

0.563
0.919
0.744
0.721
0.677

.5600
0.2263
0.1613
0.1537
.3128
.1887
.1446

0.325
0.017
0.008
0.009
0.139
0.059
0.078

1.094

0.785
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Separated
2.7483
0.189
Divorced
1.8969
0.182
Widowed
1.4200
0.742
Race
White
.4862
0.065
Hispanic
.6358
0.330
Asian/PacIs
1.378
0.548
AmerInd
.4997
0.559
Other
.6624
0.570
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
.9674
0.970
Problem Solver
1.147
0.876
First Responder
.9109
0.918
Peacekeeper
1.8714
0.502
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 2 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement
action for two adults fighting in the street, for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment,
gender, education, tenure, and family status. Rank and tenure were statistically significant. For
this scenario, 477 (76.32%) would not take enforcement action and 148 (23.68%) would take
enforcement action.
Supervisors are more than twice as likely to take enforcement action when dealing with a
street fight than a non-supervisor (OR=2.3481, p=0.018). Tenure was negatively associated with
the decision to take enforcement action. Respondents with Tenure 11-15 years, are 77% less
likely to take enforcement action (OR=0.2263, p=0.017) compared to the tenure category, New
Hires-5 years (New Hires). Tenure 16-20 years are 84% less likely to take enforcement action
(OR=0.1613, p=0.008) compared to New Hires. Tenure 21-25 years are 85% less likely to take
enforcement action (OR=0.1537, p=0.009) compared to New Hires. From this, we can surmise
that as a law enforcement officer’s career progresses, the likelihood of taking enforcement action
for a street fight decreases, compared to New Hires.
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Officer’s responses for Scenario 2
In Scenario 2 (N=625), 76.3% (n=477) elected not to take enforcement action. For those
officers not taking enforcement action, 40% (n=224) stated in their open-field responses they did
not consider a street fight the type of offense that would require enforcement. Many respondents
for this explanation stated they would, “Send them on their way.” Thirty percent preferred to use
discretion and not take enforcement action. Many qualified their answers by stating enforcement
action would be required if they were addressing a chronic condition, or if the combatants
refused to cease and desist (see Appendix L).
In Scenario 2, 23.7% (n=148) elected to take enforcement action. For those taking
enforcement action 16% (n=89) stated they are paid to enforce the law. Additional reasons were:
It’s my duty/job, I have to discourage poor behavior, or doing nothing sends the wrong message
(see Appendix L, Table 26). Eight percent (n=45) would take enforcement action, but qualified
their choice by stating: “It depends on the circumstances, I would also consider discretion, or use
enforcement to correct negative behavior.”
Scenario 3 Results
Scenario 3 involves a routine car stop for a traffic violation. No one is challenging or
interfering with the officer. The offense may be correctable with either an arrest or summons.
The officer may also choose to exercise discretion, and not take any enforcement action.
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 3 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement
action for a routine car stop for a traffic infraction, for predictor variables: rank, age, race,
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status. This model was not statistically
significant (p=0.7636). None of the predictor variables in this model were statistically
significant.
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Table 11: Scenario 3, Logistic Regression Results for Car Stop
S3: Car Stop
(N=594)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30
31-35
36+
Family Status
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Race
White
Hispanic
Asian/PacIs

Odds Ratio

Prob.

1.0844

0.762

.9854
1.3740
1.2695

0.949
0.514
0.506

.8393
1.156

0.586
0.912

.8657
1.3012
1.5200

0.802
0.673
0.523

.7946
1.3358
1.0670
.8642
.4248
Omitted

0.885
0.855
0.967
0.926
0.634

1.4463
1.4986
.9870
1.0180
.8607
.6202
.5396

0.480
0.451
0.982
0.977
0.828
0.516
0.481

.9475
1.5033
1.0705
.7315

0.850
0.605
0.872
1.736

.6971
1.2341
1.2024

0.326
0.630
0.725
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AmerInd
.4591
0.416
Other
1.6451
0.478
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
.6120
0.519
Problem Solver
.8653
0.848
First Responder
.7778
0.745
Peacekeeper
1.0675
0.932
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.
Officer’s responses for Scenario 3
In Scenario 3 (N=623), 54% (n=338) elected to take enforcement action. For those
officers taking enforcement action, 28% (n=153) stated in their open-field responses they acted
out of a narrower interpretation of their responsibilities (e.g., their duty, it’s the law, or people
are responsible for their actions). Additionally, 25% of respondents (n=137) taking enforcement
action, qualified their behavior with statements that they would be amenable to exercising
discretion and the actions of the civilian drive the action of the officer (e.g., a confrontational
public would reduce the probability of extending discretion). An explanation repeated in many
of the responses was (in effect), “If I have to pull you over, you’re getting a ticket.”
In Scenario 3, 46% (n=285) elected not to take enforcement action. For those not taking
enforcement action, 30% (n=162) stated they would use discretion. Influencing their decision
were either the actions of the motorist or whether the officer is addressing a chronic condition.
Six percent (n=34) not taking enforcement action would only warn or admonish the motorist.
Scenario 4 Results
Scenario 4 involves two adults fighting in the street except this time, bystanders
challenge the officer by recording the interaction on their cell phones. No one is physically
interfering with the officer. The offense may be correctable with either an arrest or summons.
The officer may also choose to exercise discretion, and not take any enforcement action.
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Table 12: Scenario 4, Logistic Regression Results for Cell Phone Challenge
S4: Cell Phone
Challenge (N=589)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30
31-35
36+
Family Status
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Race
White
Hispanic
Asian/PacIs

Odds Ratio

Prob.

2.9705

0.000

1.0942
2.0113
1.0418

0.707
0.167
0.910

1.1965
Omitted

0.605

2.3975
3.1565
1.9734

0.229
0.134
0.397

.1852
.4490
.3034
.4963
.2482
Omitted

0.293
0.616
0.450
0.660
0.442

1.2359
.8039
.4634
.3818
.5907
.4213
.5166

0.729
0.729
0.259
0.174
0.499
0.306
0.505

.9613
.4126
2.8374
1.0716

0.896
0.314
0.018
0.949

1.4857
2.2498
2.1966

0.310
0.074
0.140
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AmerInd
1.3057
0.784
Other
1.0918
0.903
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
2.5336
0.291
Problem Solver
2.0536
0.412
First Responder
2.0385
0.424
Peacekeeper
1.7943
0.528
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 4 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement
action for a street fight while the officer was recorded by civilians’ cell phones, for predictor
variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status. This model
is statistically significant (p=0.0058). Rank and Family Status were significant predictor
variables.
In Scenario 4, 62% of respondents stated they would not take enforcement action in this
scenario (compared to 38% that would). Supervisors are more than twice as likely to take
enforcement action when cell phone recorded, while handling a street fight (OR=2.9705,
p=0.000) compared to non-supervisors. Divorced officers are more than twice as likely to take
enforcement action in this scenario (OR=2.8374, p=0.018) compared to Single, Never Married.
Officer’s responses for Scenario 4
In Scenario 4 (N=622), 62% (n=387) elected not to take enforcement action. For those
officers not taking enforcement action, the highest returned open-field responses/explanations
was 22% (n=120) stating they would use discretion and be guided by the demeanor or actions of
the civilians involved. Table 13 captures the top responses for not taking enforcement in
Scenario 4.
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Table 13: Top Responses for No Enforcement (Scenario 4)
Response: No Enforcement

Frequency

Percentage

Prefer discretion, public demeanor

120

22%

Recordings don’t influence LE decision

100

18%

No serious offense, no enforcement needed

77

14%

Current climate jeopardizes one’s career

12

2%

For Scenario 4, 38% (n=235) chose to take enforcement action. Of those providing
written responses, the highest frequency response at 11% (n=62) stated they would take
enforcement action expressly because they were recorded. In this group of responses, officers
stated enforcement action would justify their public interaction (i.e., stopping the subject), if later
challenged by their respective civilian complaint/disciplinary boards. See Table 14 for the top
responses explaining why respondents took action in Scenario 4.
Table 14: Top Responses for Taking Enforcement Action (Scenario 4)
Response: Enforcement Action

Frequency

Percentage

Recording triggers enforcement

62

11%

They’re paid to enforce the law

61

11%

Would take action, but open to discretion

43

8%

Recording means nothing, take enforcement action

34

6%

Scenario 5 Results
Scenario 5 involves an act of civil disobedience (a low-level offense) at a demonstration.
Most of the public comply with the officer’s instructions to keep the walkway clear for
pedestrians, but two people verbally challenge the officer by attacking the officer’s legitimacy to
tell civilians what to do at a demonstration. The officers are not recorded and no one is
physically preventing them from doing their job. One of the protestors not complying, reads
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aloud the officer’s name and badge number from their uniform and states “cops have no business
or authority over a free people.” This is a verbal challenge to the officer. Table 15 outlines the
statistically significant independent variables in this model.
Table 15: Scenario 5, Logistic Regression Results for Verbal Challenge
S5: Verbal Challenge
(N=592)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
High School
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30
31-35
36+
Family Status
Married
Separated

Odds Ratio

Prob.

1.9936

0.012

.7585
1.3916
.8952

0.244
0.525
0.760

.8301
.4608

0.587
0.610

2.1586
2.0947
2.1052

0.216
0.268
0.288

Omitted
8.5147
8.7695
8.7374
6.1429
Omitted
Omitted

0.069
0.064
0.060
0.119

.5494
.6434
.6381
.6923
.3052
.5036
.4367

0.281
0.439
0.470
0.573
0.099
0.369
0.356

0.4426
1.455

0.011
0.680
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Divorced
1.056
0.910
Widowed
.2305
0.138
Race
White
1.5542
0.242
Hispanic
2.064
0.110
Asian/PacIs
1.009
0.986
AmerInd
.4731
0.445
Other
2.257
0.263
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
.5558
0.502
Problem Solver
.5170
0.448
First Responder
.4446
0.359
Peacekeeper
.5315
0.488
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 5 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement
action for civil disobedience during a demonstration, for predictor variables: rank, age, race,
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status. In this scenario, protestors verbally
challenged the authority and legitimacy of the officers. No recordings occurred. Scenario 5 is
statistically significant (p=0.0443). Rank and Family Status were significant predictor variables.
Rank had a positive relationship to enforcement whereas Family Status had a negative
relationship for married officers.
In Scenario 5, 61% of respondents stated they would take enforcement action in this
scenario (compared to 39% that would not). Supervisors are more likely to take enforcement
action (OR=1.9936, p=0.012) when challenged during an act of civil disobedience (p=0.012),
compared to non-supervisors. Married officers are 56% less likely to take enforcement action
(OR=0.4426, p=0.011), compared to Single, Never Married officers.
Officer’s responses for Scenario 5
In this scenario of 624 respondents, 61% (n=381) elected to take enforcement action. Of
those officers taking enforcement action, 36% percent (n=194) stated they did so out of a sense
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of duty or professional obligation; 25% (n=136) also opted for enforcement action but remain
amenable to discretion, if the circumstances warrant.
In Scenario 5, 39% (n=243) chose not to take enforcement action. Of those not choosing
enforcement action 22% percent (n=121) stated they would rather exercise discretion. Eight
percent (n=42) felt the offense did not rise to a serious enough level to warrant enforcement in
this scenario, with many officers electing to “send them on their way.” Six percent (n=32) would
not take action due to the current political and social climate, which can place one’s career in
jeopardy (see Appendix J).
Scenario 6 Results
This scenario is a routine car stop for a traffic violation. The motorist takes exception to
the officer’s actions and states the stop was predicated on profiling and discrimination. No one
is physically interfering with the officer. Bystanders observe the verbal exchange between the
motorist and the officer. Onlookers are manually documenting (i.e., writing down) the street
name, police radio car number, and other particulars about the stop. No one is electronically
recording you. One onlooker says, “Try to get his name and badge number too. We may need it
later.” The offense may be correctable with either an arrest or summons. The officer may also
choose to exercise discretion, and not take any enforcement action. This is a passive challenge to
the officer. Table 16 outlines the statistically significant independent variables in this scenario.
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Table 16: Scenario 6, Logistic Regression Results for Passive Challenge
S6: Passive Challenge
(N=592)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
High School
HS + credits
AA/AS
BA/BS
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30
31-35
36+
Family Status
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Race
White
Hispanic

Odds Ratio

Prob.

2.0685

0.016

1.3058
.49575
4.1328

0.363
0.174
0.029

.8178
Omitted

0.623

2.8992
3.0534
2.4810

0.106
0.123
0.230

Omitted
9.6941
11.8220
8.7859
8.7960
Omitted
Omitted

0.024
0.014
0.024
0.027

.4735
.8394
.3466
6929
.4102
.4635
.3632

0.226
0.787
0.133
0.625
0.272
0.374
0.310

.7695
.9399
1.1895
.4828

0.464
0.947
0.749
0.489

1.4584
1.9299

0.355
0.204
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Asian/PacIs
1.0126
0.984
AmerInd
.6995
0.718
Other
1.0846
0.910
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
1.0035
0.997
Problem Solver
1.0221
0.979
First Responder
1.576
0.601
Peacekeeper
.8395
0.844
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 6 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement
action during a routine car stop with passive confrontation, which included civilians making a
written record of the police-person interaction, for predictor variables: rank, age, race,
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status. This model is statistically significant
(Obs.=592, LR X2(32)=48.23, p=0.0327, Pseudo R2=0.0765). Rank, Assignment, and Education
were significant and positively related to the predictor variable Enforcement.
In Scenario 6, 78% of respondents stated they would take enforcement action in this
scenario (compared to 22% that would not). Supervisors are more likely to take enforcement
action when passively challenged during a traffic stop (OR=2.0685, p=0.016) compared to nonsupervisors.
Officers assigned to Quality Control/Internal Affairs are more likely to take enforcement
action in Scenario 6 (OR=4.1328, p=0.029) compared to officers with patrol/field assignments.
High School graduates with some college credits are more likely to take enforcement action
(OR=9.6941, p=0.024) compared to high school only graduates. Officers with Associate degrees
are 11.8 times more likely to take enforcement action (OR=11.8220, p=0.014) compared to high
school only graduates. Baccalaureate degree recipients are more likely to take enforcement
action (OR=8.7859, p=0.024) compared to high school only graduates. Master degree recipients
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are more likely to take enforcement action (OR=8.7960, p=0.027) compared to high school only
graduates.
Officer’s responses for Scenario 6
In this scenario (N=626), 78% (n=489) elected to take enforcement action. Of those
taking action, and willing to provide an explanation of their decision, 42% (n=227) stated they
took enforcement action out of a sense of duty or professional obligation. In Scenario 6, 28%
(n=151) stated because their interaction with the public was “expressly noted” (i.e., documented
or recorded), the officer elected to take enforcement action or felt the need to protect themselves
and justify the public interaction, if later challenged by civilian review boards. Another eight
percent (n=43) stated they would take enforcement action, but were willing to consider
discretion, based on the demeanor of the civilian, or if the circumstances warranted discretion.
In Scenario 6, 22% (n=137) chose not to take enforcement action. Of those not taking
action, and willing to provide an explanation of their decision, 12% (n=66) stated they would
rather exercise discretion, but may feel differently if addressing a chronic condition, or if the
person was cooperative with police.
Discretion with Minorities and Teenagers
Instead of asking whether police would take enforcement action against minorities, the
dichotomous choices were changed to ascertain whether officers were more likely or less likely
to extend discretion. Rewording the dependent variable was necessary since discussing
enforcement on minorities triggered varying levels of sensitivity and concern in respondents.
Early in this study’s design phase, the survey instrument was tested. Initial survey
feedback from respondents expressed trepidation over taking enforcement action against
minorities. Test officers were more comfortable responding to questions measuring discretion
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(essentially “cutting the person a break”). Table 17 reports the results for these two survey
questions. Neither model is statistically significant.
Table 17: Results of Discretionary Decision-making Analysis
Enforcement Subject

Obs.

LR X2 (df)

Prob.

Pseud. R2

Estat

Estat

Null

Model

Discretion and Minorities

425

27.13 (32)

0.7117

0.0491

64.60%

65.41%

Discretion and Teenagers

556

41.94 (33)

0.1367

0.0544

50.68%

61.15%

Discretion and the Minority Community
Logistic regression measured the likelihood of extending discretion to members of a
racial/ethnic minority group. The bivariate choice of more likely or less likely to extend
discretion, was measured for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education,
tenure, and family status. This model is not statistically significant (Obs.=425, LR
X2(32)=27.13, p=0.7117, Pseudo R2=0.0491). None of the predictor variables in this model were
significant. Estat testing demonstrates a correct classification rate of 65.41%, which improved
upon the null model of 64.60% by 0.81%, as a predictive model for testing officer discretion of
minority clients.
Officer’s responses for minority discretion
When interacting with the minority community, 65% (n=292) of respondents are more
likely to use discretion. Table 18 outlines the results of significance testing for minority
discretion. Table 19 notes the most returned responses for enforcement when interacting with
minority members (masked as a question of exercising discretion).

71
Table 18: Logistic Regression Results for Minority Discretion
Minority Discretion
(N=425)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30
31-35
36+
Family Status
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Race
White
Hispanic
Asian/PacIs

Odds Ratio

Prob.

1.0919

0.796

1.6862
1.3851
.9073

0.105
0.562
0.807

.9544
Omitted

0.912

.8017
.6779
.7139

0.736
0.592
0.660

4.2224
3.6517
5.0499
5.2305
Omitted
Omitted

0.387
0.437
0.324
0.319

.6527
.7678
.6801
.6726
1.4819
1.1263
2.6266

0.495
0.680
0.593
0.600
0.653
0.895
0.467

1.7467
2.1101
1.9562
5.1571

0.089
0.441
0.189
0.243

1.5514
1.0738
.9217

0.304
0.888
0.891
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AmerInd
3.9534
0.263
Other
1.2195
0.800
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
2.2521
0.451
Problem Solver
3.1928
0.280
First Responder
1.8490
0.572
Peacekeeper
3.6789
0.248
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.

Table 19: Responses Against Using Enforcement on Minority Members of the Public
Officer’s Response

Frequency

Percentage

More likely to use discretion, stated they treat everyone

118

23%

38

7%

23

4%

the same, race did not matter to the officer, or they
always remain objective
Would use discretion because they do not want to be
judged racist, enforcement would look bad on social
media, expressed fear of scapegoating by their
department/municipal government, or wanted to avoid
confrontation
Would need to judge the severity/gravity and totality of
the circumstances of each incident
.
For the question of enforcement on members of the minority community, 35% (n=160)
were less likely to use discretion. Table 20 notes the most returned responses for taking
enforcement when interacting with minority members.

73
Table 20: Responses from Officers Using Enforcement on Minority Members of the Public
Officer’s Response

Frequency

Percentage

Stated they treat everyone the same, or remain uninfluenced

100

19%

18

4%

by one’s race
Felt less likely to extend discretion to minorities but were
willing to consider the severity/gravity and totality of
circumstances in each incident.
Unlike the vignettes used in the six scenarios for this survey, the issue of minorities and
law enforcement discretion generated the most negative feedback from respondents (in the open
comments area) for this specific question. Appendix L reports the answer categories returned for
the question of minorities and enforcement. The question was considered offensive by 38% of
respondents (n=168) with written feedback that included the phrases: offensive or objectionable.
Some respondents retorted with nonsensical or inappropriate comments to the researcher, or
expressed indifference to the purpose of this question. This was the highest number of “protest”
comments, returned in this survey. Some departments did not participate in this study because of
the potential sensitivity over this question and how their officers might answer it.
Sensitivity to discussing discretion and enforcement in minority communities, impacted
convenience sampling efforts. One relatively sizable department in a mid-western state refused
to administer the survey to their personnel unless the question on minority discretion was
removed. Another department, located on the west coast, questioned whether a binary choice
was an appropriately objective option for their officers. They too declined to participate.
Neither agency was dissuaded, even when this researcher’s explained that respondents had the
right and ability to skip any question they did not want to answer.
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Discretion and Teenagers
Respondents (N=586) were asked, whether they were more likely or less likely to take
enforcement action when interacting with teenagers in enforcement scenarios (for low-level
misdemeanor or petty offenses). For this question, 51% (n=297) are unlikely to take
enforcement action when interacting with teenagers.
Logistic regression measured the likelihood of taking enforcement action against teenage
offenders. The bivariate choice of more likely or less likely to take enforcement action, was
measured for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and
family status. This model is not statistically significant (Obs.=556, LR X2(33)=41.94, p=0.1367,
Pseudo R2=0.0544). Estat testing demonstrates a correct classification rate of 61.15% compared
to 50.68% for the null model. This is an improvement of 10.47% on the null, as a predictive
model.
Table 21:Logistic Regression Results for Teens and Enforcement
Teenagers and Enforce.
(N=556)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS

Odds Ratio

Prob.

1.3305

0.307

1.2673
1.1717
2.6104

0.325
0.742
0.013

1.5252
2.5216

0.219
0.539

4.7012
9.0488
7.0621

0.025
0.003
0.011

5.3181
7.3277

0.149
0.084
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BA/BA
5.7647
0.122
MA/MS
5.5176
0.136
JD
Omitted
PhD/EdD
Omitted
Tenure
6-10
.4117
0.132
11-15 years
.3599
0.088
16-20 years
.1844
0.010
21-25 years
.2623
0.0550
26-30
.2658
0.079
31-35
.1683
0.026
36+
.6304
0.633
Family Status
Married
1.1274
0.682
Separated
1.4433
0.650
Divorced
1.5650
0.313
Widowed
.7111
0.746
Race
White
.8562
0.671
Hispanic
1.4926
0.357
Asian/PacIs
1.8789
0.245
AmerInd
.94317
0.949
Other
1.0736
0.914
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
.8061
0.822
Problem Solver
.6845
0.692
First Responder
.6332
0.638
Peacekeeper
.6205
0.634
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.

The independent variables Age and Tenure were significant in this model. Age had a
positive relationship for the likelihood of taking enforcement action. Age group 30-39 were
more likely to take enforcement action (OR=4.7012, p=0.025) against teenagers, compared to
Age group 20-29 (the baseline group). Age group 40-49 were nine times more likely to take
enforcement action (OR=9.0488, p=0.003) against teenagers, compared to Age group 20-29.
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Group 50-over were seven times more likely to take enforcement action (OR=7.0621, p=0.011)
against teenagers, compared to Age group 20-29.
The variable Tenure had a negative relationship to taking enforcement action. Officers
with 16-20 years of service were 82% less likely to take enforcement action against teenagers
compared to the baseline group of Newly Hired officers (OR=0.1844, p=0.010). Tenure 21-25
were 74% less likely to take enforcement action, compared to Newly Hired officers (OR=0.2623,
p=0.050). Tenure 31-35 are 83% less likely to take enforcement action, compared to Newly
Hired officers (OR=0.1683, p=0.026).
Officer’s responses for enforcement on teenagers
To explain their choices, 28% (n=136) stated they would not take enforcement action
against a teenager because juveniles are either more problematic to arrest, require greater latitude
due to their age, use the opportunity as a teaching moment, or there was no need to ruin their
lives with a criminal record. Five percent (n=23) also stated they would not take enforcement
action against a teenager but would need to consider the person’s demeanor, attitude, or maturity
in their decision. Five percent (n=21) would not take enforcement action because they consider
enforcement action against teenagers either a waste of time, provides no political or department
support to an officer if there is a negative result, or the officer provided an apathetic response.
Appendix K demonstrates the answer categories returned for the question of teenagers and
enforcement.
For this question on teenagers and discretion, 49% (n=289) were likely to take
enforcement action. Of those taking enforcement action against teenagers, 20% (n=98) stated
age does not make a difference, the law is the law. Another 14% (n=69) felt enforcement action
was a teaching opportunity to reinforce proper behavior, or that age was not a disqualifier. Eight
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percent (n=38) would take enforcement action against a teen but would also consider the teen’s
demeanor, mitigating circumstances, or the level of respect offered by the youth.
Influence of Media Messaging, Labeling, and Role on Law Enforcement Behavior
The remaining survey questions asked respondents how negative law enforcement news
impacts them, where they get this news, what they do with this negative news/information,
whether negative labeling exist, and whether they feel they play an important role in public
safety. See Table 22 for an overview of the logistic regression results for these areas.
Table 22: Results of Analyses on the Importance of News, Labeling, and Role
Influencer on Police

Obs.

LR X2 (df)

Prob.

Behavior

Pseud.

Estat

Estat

R2

Null

Model

Neg. Law Enf. News

551

37.45 (31)

0.1972

0.0998

89.62%

89.84%

Neg. Public Labeling

710

42.80 (28)

0.0364

0.1319

94.42%

93.94%

Role Importance

667

44.78 (28)

0.0232

0.1338

93.81%

93.55%

Note: Shaded models are statistically significant.
Impact of Media Reporting on Law Enforcement Behavior
Logistic regression testing examined the impact negative news has on law enforcement.
The bivariate output (i.e., Yes or No) gauged whether officers were impacted by negative news,
for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.
This model is not statistically significant (Obs.=551, LR X2(31)=37.45, p=0.1972, Pseudo
R2=0.0998). Estat testing demonstrates a correct classification rate of 89.84%, which improves
upon the null model of 89.62%. Tenure was significant and positively related to the dependent
variable in this model.
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Table 23: Logistic Regression Results for Impact of Negative Law Enforcement News
Neg. LE News
(N=551)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30
31-35
36+
Family Status
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Race
White
Hispanic
Asian/PacIs

Odds Ratio

Prob.

.5391

0.222

.9886
Omitted
2.0605

0.976

.2734
Omitted

0.105

.3063
.2551
.2447

0.287
0.244
0.240

4.7165
4.3030
3.9538
1.4896
Omitted
Omitted

0.405
0.431
0.446
0.826

3.1736
5.7077
5.8111
5.9919
3.6731
3.3674
10.740

0.174
0.041
0.062
0.071
0.224
0.280
0.114

.8098
.1761
.5947
.2353

0.688
0.072
0.469
0.237

1.7291
2.1256
.5257

0.327
0.295
0.387

0.355
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AmerInd
.2952
0.269
Other
.6875
0.665
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
2.8142
0.268
Problem Solver
2.2175
0.386
First Responder
2.5097
0.338
Peacekeeper
2.0977
0.467
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.

For the question on media reporting, 544 respondents (89.62%) stated they were affected
by negative law enforcement news (our baseline response for this dependent variable), even if
that agency/municipality is geographically located far from their own, compared to 63 (10.38%)
who stated they were not affected (i.e., responded with No). Officers in the Tenure group 11-15
years of service, are five times more likely to be affected by negative law enforcement news
(OR=5.7077, p=0.041), compared to Newly Hired (the baseline group for Tenure).
Where Does Law Enforcement Gets their News?
As a follow-up question to whether officers are affected by negative news reports on law
enforcement related topics, respondents were asked to identify where they get their news
(N=607). Most law enforcement personnel in this study stated they get their information from
broadcast media (59.9%). Table 24 is an overview of news sources for law enforcement in this
study.
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Table 24: Results for Sources of Law Enforcement News
Sources of Law Enforcement News (N=607)

Frequency

Percentage

Broadcast Media

364

59.9%

Social Media

143

23.6%

Peers

46

7.6%

Labor Unions

34

5.6%

Police Leaders

20

3.3%

607

100%

TOTAL

When asked how negative law enforcement news made them feel, 40% (n=246) selected
from the prefix responses stating they continued to do their job as they have always done. Table
25 notes the major responses for the question about their feelings/responses to negative law
enforcement news.
Table 25: Responses to Law Enforcement News Stories
Officer’s Written Responses

Frequency

Percentage

Will continue to do their job as they have always done

246

40%

Made them feel as if law enforcement was unfairly maligned

217

36%

87

14%

and mischaracterized in the news
Negative news caused them to be more cognizant of their own
personal safety while on patrol and more tactically alert
Public Labeling and Law Enforcement Behavior
Respondents (N=789) were asked whether they believe the public placed negative labels
on law enforcement. In response to public labeling, 94% (n=745) stated they believed the public
negatively labeled law enforcement officers. Six percent (n=44) felt the public did not
negatively label law enforcement.
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Logistic regression tested perceived negative public labeling as a bivariate choice (i.e.,
Yes or No), for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and
family status. This model is statistically significant (Obs.=710, LR X2(28)=42.80, p=0.0364,
Pseudo R2=0.1319). Estat testing demonstrated a correct classification rate of 93.94% but it did
not improve upon the null model of 94.42%. Age (positively related) and Family Status
(negatively related) were statistically significant. Race was marginally significant.
Table 26: Logistic Regression Results for Negative Public Labeling of Law Enforcement
Labeling
(N=710)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD
PhD/EdD
Tenure
6-10
11-15 years
16-20 years
21-25 years
26-30

Odds Ratio

Prob.

1.0790

0.884

.87720
1.2898
2.3591

0.776
0.818
0.420

.4040
.0957

0.250
0.120

6.6673
1.7530
1.5226

0.014
0.500
0.641

2.7937
3.5113
1.5732
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

0.122
0.076
0.284

.8741
1.8549
2.1015
4.0991
6.4005

0.859
0.467
0.426
0.160
0.128
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31-35
3.9050
0.273
36+
Omitted
Family Status
Married
.7223
0.544
Separated
.1427
0.042
Divorced
.3252
0.125
Widowed
Omitted
Race
White
2.7876
0.051
Hispanic
2.3464
0.217
Asian/PacIs
7.0364
0.113
AmerInd
Omitted
Other
1.7081
0.585
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
1.0864
0.893
Problem Solver
1.0173
0.976
First Responder
1.0999
0.885
Peacekeeper
Omitted
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.

For the variable Age, respondents in category 30-39 were six times more likely to feel the
public negatively labels law enforcement officers (OR=6.6673, p=0.014), compared to age
category 20-29 (the baseline for this variable).
For the variable Family Status, respondents in the Separated category were 86% less
likely to perceive that the public negatively labeled law enforcement officers (OR=0.1427,
p=0.042), compared to Single, Never Married officers (the baseline for this variable).
For the variable Race, Whites were twice as likely to feel the public negatively labeled
law enforcement (OR=2.7876, p=0.051) compared to Blacks (the baseline for this variable).
This was marginally significant because the resulting probability was slightly above the
threshold for statistical testing in this report (p=.05).
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Examining Role Importance
Respondents (N=791) were asked whether they believed they played an important role in
public safety and maintaining social order. For the question on their role in policing, 94%
(n=742) stated they believed they played an important role in public safety and social order. Six
percent (n=49) believed they did not.
Logistic regression tested role importance as a bivariate choice (i.e., Yes or No), for
predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.
This model is statistically significant (Obs.=667, LR X2(28)=44.78, p=0.0232, Pseudo
R2=0.1338). Estat testing demonstrated a correct classification rate of 93.55%, which did not
improve upon the null model of 93.81%.
Table 27: Plays an Important Role in Public Safety and Order
Role in Public Safety
(N=667)
Rank
Supervisor
Assignment
Staff/Support
Training
Quality Control
Gender
Male
Non-binary
Age
30-39
40-59
50-over
Education
H.S. +credits
AA/AS
BA/BA
MA/MS
JD

Odds Ratio

Prob.

2.7554

0.029

.6276
.4471
1.8958

0.222
0.333
0.545

.9819
.0181

0.977
0.051

13.8251
26.3555
79.0111

0.080
0.040
0.009

.9901
.8987
1.2668
Omitted
Omitted

0.986
0.852
0.626
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PhD/EdD
Omitted
Tenure
6-10
.2434
0.328
11-15 years
.0270
0.041
16-20 years
.0096
0.011
21-25 years
.0084
0.011
26-30
.0037
0.004
31-35
.0116
0.038
36+
Omitted
Family Status
Married
.4459
0.262
Separated
Omitted
Divorced
2.3402
0.498
Widowed
Omitted
Race
White
.6997
0.649
Hispanic
1.6277
0.621
Asian/PacIs
Omitted
AmerInd
.4467
0.561
Other
Omitted
Defined Role
Crime Fighter
3.8544
0.161
Problem Solver
3.5590
0.178
First Responder
7.0724
0.059
Peacekeeper
5.7346
0.119
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.
Rank was significant and positively related to the respondent feeling that they played an
important role in public safety. Supervisors were two times more likely to feel they played an
important role (OR=2.7554, p=0.029), compared to non-supervisors.
Age was significant and positively related to respondents who felt they play a role. Age
group 40-49 were 26.3 times more likely to feel they play an important role (OR=26.3555,
p=0.040) compared to age group 20-29 (the baseline for this category). Age group 50-over were
79 times more likely to feel they play an important role (OR=79.0111, p=0.009) compared to
group 20-29.
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Tenure was significant and negatively related to the dependent variable. Officers with 1115 years of service were 97% less like to feel they played a role (OR=0.0270, p=0.041),
compared to the tenure category Newly hired-5 years (the baseline category for this variable).
Officers with 16-20 years of service are 99% less like to feel they play a role (OR=0.0096,
p=0.011), compared to Newly Hired-5 years. Officers with 21-25 years of service are 99.2% less
like to feel they play a role (OR=0.0841, p=0.011), compared to Newly Hired-5 years. Officers
with 26-30 years of service are 99.7% less like to feel they play a role (OR=0.0037, p=0.004),
compared to Newly Hired-5 years. Officers with 31-35 years of service are 99% less like to feel
they play a role (OR=0.0116, p=0.038), compared to Newly Hired-5 years.
Variables Gender and Defined Role were marginally significant, since they were slightly
outside the 95% probability threshold for statistical testing. Non-binary respondents in the
variable Gender were 99% less likely to feel they played a role in maintaining public safety and
order (OR=0.0181, p=0.051), compared to Females (the baseline for this variable).
Respondents classifying their role as First Responder, for the variable Defined Role were
seven times more likely to feel they played an important public safety role (OR=7.0724,
p=0.059), compared to those identifying as Safety Expert (the baseline for this variable).
Options for Statistical Testing: Path Analysis
In designing this study, one of the initial conceptual models for statistical analysis was
going to examine whether the use of body worn cameras (BWC) had an impact (as a mediating
variable) on officers’ enforcement decisions. Path analysis was chosen because it often
complements logistic regression. Path analysis would have been appropriate if all independent
variables for the model were all correlated to each other. For this dataset, they are not (Table 4).
Therefore, path analysis was excluded in this study.
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Examining body camera footage as a mediating variable, in an environment where public
cell phone recording is highly probable, could help with understanding whether law enforcement
officers see BWCs as a way for them to provide or capture a more objective narrative. BWCs
are government property, subject to discovery in court and FOIL requests by other interested
parties (i.e., private citizens, institutions, anyone with interest in the footage). FOIL requests are
subject to redactions, editing, or a government agency’s refusal to comply, if the footage
contained material subject to exclusion provisions (such as the identity of sex crime victims,
juveniles, employee personal information, etc.).11 In comparison, cell phone video is capable of
real-time streaming on social media.
Constructing path analysis in STATA
Using the graphical user interface (GUI) modeling feature in STATA, the path analysis
model and equations are drafted directly onscreen, with the user not having to enter syntax to run
statistical testing, as the software runs the computations behind the GUI display. See Figure 2
for the path model initially conceived for this analysis.

11

New York State Civil Rights Law § 50a.
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Figure 2: Conceptualized Path Model 12
The model in Figure 2 depicts the nine independent variables used in this study, to
determine whether there is a mediating effect from a BWC, on the decision to take enforcement
action or exercise discretion. This type of design, “is a recursive path model because the flow of
influence goes in a single direction, there is no feedback” (Acock, 2013, p. 63). Using STATA,
the user defines the types of testing to compute the relationships for these variables, as well as
the errors for the endogenous variables (i.e., dependent variables). This would be repeated for
each of the scenarios (by changing the dependent variable) as well as the binary output testing
for minority enforcement, teenage enforcement, labeling, and law enforcement role. Future

12

Graphic created by author, C. Mercado (2019).
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researchers electing to use path analysis, may find it useful for computing and interpreting their
results, when examining variables for similar relationships.
Examining the Intersectionality of Race and Gender
Statistical testing was repeated for intersectionality by removing the individual
independent variables of Race and Gender, and replacing them with one intersecting variable
(GendRace). Potentially relevant intersectionality would present itself as a statistically
significant finding for a racial group, by gender. Male white (n=508) represented the largest
demographic in this study (66.5%).
Initially, there were 18 GendRace categories in this study (Table 28), which were the
result of three gender classifications and six racial classifications. The granularity of this
GendRace variable was problematic as Native Americans, Asian Females, Black Females, and
others contained less than twenty respondents. Their responses in these sparsely populated
categories (as a percentage of their representation in their classification) could skew this analysis.
Therefore, the variable was reconfigured to include the intersecting variables with more than
twenty cases, which resulted in five categories (N=713). Cases with a frequency of twenty
respondents or less, were excluded from the analysis. The five categories for GendRace are
Female White (n=42), Male Black (n=39), Male White (n=508), Male Hispanic (n=83), and
Male Asian (n=41).
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Table 28: Intersecting Variable Race & Gender
Officer Race & Gender (Variable coding)

Frequency (n)

Percentage

Female Black (1)

10

1.3%

Female White (2)

42

5.5%

Female Hispanic/Latina (3)

13

1.7%

Female Asian (4)

2

0.3%

Female Amer. Ind., 1 Nation, or Alaskan (5)

1

0.1%

Female Other (6)

1

0.1%

Male Black (7)

39

5.1%

Male White (8)

508

66.5%

Male Hispanic/Latino (9)

83

10.9%

Male Asian (10)

41

5.4%

Male Amer. Ind., 1st Nation, or Alaskan (11)

5

0.7%

Male Other (12)

15

2.0%

Other Black (13)

0

N/A

Other White (14)

2

0.3%

Other Hispanic/Latino (15)

0

N/A

Other Asian (16)

1

0.1%

Other Amer. Ind., 1st Nation, or Alaskan (17)

0

N/A

Other Other (18)

1

0.1%

764

100%

st

TOTALS

None of the statistically significant models contained the intersecting variable GendRace.
Table 29 captures an overview of the findings for all intersectionality testing. When gender and
race were maintained as separate variables, Scenario 4, Scenario 5, Scenario 6, Role in Public
Safety, and Negative Public Labeling were all statistically significant models. Substituting the
intersecting variable resulted in Negative Public Labeling (p=0.1414), Role in Public Safety
(p=0.0555), and Scenario 5 (p=0.0633) losing their statistical significance (by exceeding the
probability threshold of p=0.05).
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Table 29: Overview of Significant Variables for Intersecting Gender and Race
Test Environment
S1: Low-level Offense
Supervisor
S2: Fighting in Street
Supervisor
Tenure 11-15
Tenure 16-20
Tenure 21-25
Male Asian
S3: Car Stop
S4: Cell phone Challenge
Supervisor
Divorced
S5: Verbal Challenge
Supervisor
Married
S6: Passive Challenge
Supervisor
Quality Control
H.S. some Coll.
Associate Deg.
Baccalaureate Deg.
Master’s Deg.
Discretion and Minorities
Scenarios and Teenagers
Quality Control
Age 30-39
Age 40-49
Age 50+
Tenure 16-20
Tenure 21-25
Tenure 31-35
Neg. Law Enf. News
Tenure 11-15
Tenure 16-20
Tenure 21-25
Separated
Male White
Neg. Public Labeling
Associate Deg.
Role Importance

(N)
556
-557
-----556
554
--555
--588
------397
519
-------487
-----630
-591

Odds Ratio
-2.0698
-2.0751
0.2692
0.1781
0.1756
5.7788
--3.2265
2.6963
-2.2442
0.1539
-2.1213
4.1457
10.108
12.273
10.047
9.018
--2.5137
4.0484
7.3522
5.8727
0.1923
0.2287
0.1977
-6.7331
7.6262
7.6835
0.1107
3.4282
-3.9518
--

Probability
0.2079
0.018
0.1836
0.050
0.042
0.015
0.019
0.011
0.6739
0.0034
0.000
0.034
0.0633
0.005
0.020
0.0236
0.017
0.030
0.024
0.014
0.019
0.029
0.5211
0.0753
0.018
0.042
0.007
0.021
0.013
0.034
0.048
0.3363
0.033
0.038
0.046
0.035
0.027
0.1414
0.050
0.0555
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Supervisor
-3.2443
Tenure 11-15
-0.0259
Tenure 16-20
-0.0089
Tenure 21-25
-0.0083
Tenure 26-30
-0.0030
Tenure 31-35
-0.0106
First Responder
-8.3393
Note: Shaded rows are statistically significant.

0.013
0.036
0.009
0.010
0.002
0.034
0.050

Group membership and intersectionality
When independent variables Race and Gender were examined as two separate variables,
neither were statistically significant in any of the scenarios and only demonstrated significance in
the questions on Negative Public Labeling (Race) and Role in Public Safety (Gender). However,
substituting the intersecting variable GendRace resulted in statistical significance for Scenario 2
(i.e., street fight) and for the question asking whether the respondent was impacted by negative
law enforcement news.
For Scenario 2, Male Asians are five times more likely to take enforcement action than
White Females (the baseline category for this variable) during a street fight (OR=5.778,
p=0.011). When asked whether impacted by negative law enforcement news, Male Whites are
three times more likely than White Females, to state they are impacted by negative law
enforcement news (OR=3.4282, p=0.027).
Findings
Answers to Research Questions
RQ 1 asked, “Do verbal and non-verbal challenges from the public to an officer influence
their decision to take enforcement action?” This study demonstrates both verbal and non-verbal
challenges to law enforcement influence their decision for enforcement action. Scenario 4
(verbal challenge with a cell phone), Scenario 5 (verbal challenge only, no cell phone), and
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Scenario 6 (passive documentation) all show statistically significant law enforcement reactions.
Challenging an officer while recording them on your cell phone will typically not result in
enforcement action (62.22%). However, verbally challenging an officer with no cell phone
recording (61.06%) or making it a point to manually note police-citizen interaction will result in
enforcement action (78.12%).
For Scenario 4 (cell phone), respondents in their open field responses explained they
either preferred to use discretion (n=120), elected against action irrespective of the presence of
cell phone recording (n=100), or did not feel fighting in the street was serious enough to warrant
enforcement (n=77). Only 12 respondents stated they did not take enforcement action out of fear
of placing their career in jeopardy from negative public feedback.
For Scenario 5 (verbal challenge), officers explained their enforcement action came from
their sense of duty (n=194) or despite their enforcement decision, they would still remain
amenable to discretion, if the circumstances warranted it (136). In Scenario 6, officers exercised
enforcement (n=227) because they stated it is their duty.
Interestingly, 151 respondents stated they specifically exercised enforcement in Scenario
6 because the exchange was documented. There is something about the act of physically
noting/documenting an exchange with law enforcement, that caused police to “cover themselves”
from retaliatory complaints from the public (i.e., civilian complaints, law suits, etc.).
RQ 2 asked, “Does a police officer’s perceived law enforcement role govern their
decision to take police enforcement action?” There is no indication that an officer’s selfperceived role (i.e., Safety Expert, Crime Fighter, Problem Solver, First Responder, or
Peacekeeper) has any influence on their enforcement decision, for the testing scenarios
conducted in this study.
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RQ 3 asked, “What personal characteristics of police officers influence their decision to
take police enforcement action?” Divorced officers are almost three times more likely to take
enforcement action compared to single officers when recorded on a cell phone. Married officers
are 56% less likely to take enforcement action compared to single officers when verbally
challenged. Officers with college credits, associate, baccalaureate, and master degrees are more
likely to take enforcement action when passively challenged than officers with high school
diplomas.
RQ 4 asked, “What contextual characteristics of police officers influence their decision
to take police enforcement action?” Rank was statistically significant in Scenarios 4-6.
Supervisors were more likely than non-supervisors to elect enforcement when challenged with a
cell phone, verbally challenged, and passively challenged.
For Scenarios 4-6, Assignment was the only contextual characteristic with statistical
significance. Those assigned to internal affairs or other professional compliance units are more
likely to take enforcement action than personnel assigned to patrol/field operations.
RQ 5 asked, “What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with members of
minority communities?” When dealing with members of the minority community 65% of
officers are more likely to use discretion.
RQ 6 asked, “What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with teenagers?”
When dealing with teenagers, enforcement likelihood is almost even. Fifty-one percent are
unlikely to take enforcement with teenagers. For those not taking action, they felt teenagers
were more problematic to arrest but did not elaborate or they felt the person was young and did
not need a criminal record.
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RQ 7 asked, “How do law enforcement perceive the media, when reporting on law
enforcement events?” Over 89% of respondents are affected by negative law enforcements news
stories. Almost 60% get their news from broadcast news compared to the 24% that get their law
enforcement-related news from social media.
RQ 8 asked, “Is there intersectionality occurring between officers’ race and gender in the
decision to take police enforcement action?” Male Asians are five times more likely to take
enforcement action than White Females during a street fight. When asked whether impacted by
negative law enforcement news, Male Whites are three times more likely than White Females, to
state they are impacted by negative law enforcement news.
Findings for Hypotheses
Although traditional hypothesis testing was not part of this study, three hypotheses were
posited. H1 stated, “The introduction of a cell phone in a manner indicative of recording video
footage will cause some officers to disengage and decide not to arrest/summons a subject.” The
introduction of a cell phone during an interaction with a law enforcement officer, held in a
manner indicative of using it to record a police-citizen interaction, is likely not to result in
enforcement action.
H2 stated, “The defined role of the officer as crime fighter will have a greater likelihood
of arresting/summonsing the citizen/resident.” There is no indication that officers who define
their role as Crime Fighter have a statistically significant likelihood for enforcement action.
H3 stated, “African-American officers will be more likely to exercise discretion in
scenarios where they are challenged by the public.” There was no difference with African
American officers when taking enforcement action or exercising discretion, compared to any
other ethnic group in this study.
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Applicable Academic Theory in Examining Police Behavior
If we are to assume Labeling Theory is appropriately explaining police behavior rather
than their perceived role, we would expect to see officers explaining in their opened-ended
survey responses that societal challenges to their legitimacy are strong influencers in their
enforcement decision-making. We would see evidence of public challenges to officer legitimacy
(or self-legitimacy) triggering some degree of shaming effect (either specific or general), and
thereby influencing the officer’s internal metric of enforcement or discretion. This study did not
uncover evidence of that. Respondents stated they did feel the public negatively labels law
enforcement (which was statistically significant) and that police are sensitive to negative law
enforcement news but there are no corresponding indicators correlating to enforcement action.
A stronger argument is found in Role Theory, to explain the behavior in this study. Many
responses and justifications for discretion or even enforcement (depending on the scenario
presented) are often explained in terms of role, job, duty, responsibility. Role Theory posits that
both contextual and personal characteristics are significant predictors in human behavior. This
study found the variable Rank, which is a contextual characteristic, significant in the scenarios
and decision models, along with personal characteristics Education and Family Status, but to
varying degrees, contingent on the model presented to the respondent.
Is the Ferguson Effect Occurring?
If we narrowly script the question whether a Ferguson Effect is occurring for police
agencies in this study, in terms of increased crime, there is insufficient data to support that claim.
Of the 10 departments in this study, six post their crime complaint reports on publicly accessible
websites. Since this study is protecting the anonymity of its members and the participating
departments, Figure 3 depicts sparkline graphs (i.e., miniature line graphs confined to a cell
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within a table) of overall index crime, by calendar year, from 2015 through 2018, for six of the
agencies participating in this study. Green-colored fields depict decreases in overall index crime
(i.e., murder, rape, robbery, felony/aggravated assault, burglary, major theft, and car theft) from
2015-2018 while amber fields depict increases in overall index crime.

East Coast
West Coast
West Coast
West Coast
West Coast
East Coast
Figure 3: Overall Index Crime for Participating Police Agencies, 2015-2018. 13
The dynamics of criminal offending and policing are multivariate. To argue Ferguson, in
the context of increased crime, would require a causal link between de-policing and/or decreased
police self-legitimacy to a measured and sustained increase in either overall index crime, or
lower-level quality of life offenses (i.e., misdemeanors and violations), which is beyond the
scope of this report, but presents a rich opportunity for researchers.
Limitations
A key limitation in this study was the difficulty in getting police agencies, police unions,
and municipalities to participate in collecting survey data of their officers. Asking police
personnel their likelihood of taking enforcement action against people possibly perceived by
some officers as baiting or antagonizing them, is not a comfortable exercise in self-reflection. A
recent report shows that despite the growing number of studies in policing, and the convenience
of internet/digital surveying, the number of police officers participating in surveys is decreasing,
making research into law enforcement concerns, trends, fears and opinions, increasingly difficult
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to complete (Nix, Pickett, Baek, & Alpert, 2017, p. 13). In fact, research indicates, “response
rates in police surveys have declined over time” (Nix et al, 2017, p. 8).
Other impediments to collecting survey data from law enforcement is securing the
requisite permission from police departments, unions, or municipalities (sometimes all three) in
gaining access to their personnel. A supervisory member of a mid-western police department
summarized the trepidation by responding to this researcher, “Look, your study sounds
interesting but the executives do not wish to participate right now. You would also have to
secure simultaneous consent from the labor union and by the way, we’re under a consent decree,
so you can understand why we’re saying, ‘No.’”
Nix et al explain, fewer surveys returned from police personnel is not just an American
problem (2017, p. 10). Their examination of 497 police surveys, published in 15 journals from
2008 to 2017, found police in the United States (comprising 51% of their study) were no “more
or less inclined to respond to surveys than officers working elsewhere” (Nix et al, 2017, p. 10).
In fact, police participation in surveys has been decreasing over time, with statistical testing
indicating a, “significant negative correlation between survey year and response rate” (Nix et al,
2017, p. 8).
Another limitation in this study are the higher number of supervisory officers responding
to this dissertation’s surveys, compared to non-supervisory officers. This was probably a result
of the convenience sampling used in this analysis, to collect data from police personnel. As
stated earlier, convenience sampling is a non-probability-based data collection technique that
invites participants to partake in survey research, based on their availability to the researcher.
Soliciting agencies for research friendly executives or relying on favorable word-of-mouth
referrals (i.e., snowball sampling) can have a wildly varied return rate. This negatively impacts
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academic research into policing and criminology since low survey return rates (around 50%) is
often the rejection threshold for academic journals (Nix et al, 2017, pp. 7, 9-11).
Conclusions
For the law enforcement personnel in this study, the decision to take enforcement action
is often driven by the public’s demeanor and timbre. Verbally challenging officer legitimacy or
making a note of the exchange (in view of the officer)—which is the public’s right—often results
in a ticket or arrest (depending on the offense and circumstances). Cell phone recording an
exchange is unlikely to result in enforcement action. These findings differ from Chiarlitti’s
study of 88 police officers and supervisors from three departments in New York state, which
found that police officers were not swayed from their enforcement duties, due to fears of civil
litigation (Chiarlitti, 2016, pp. 75-77). This supports the feedback articulated multiple times in
this study from respondents. The balance between enforcement and discretion is conditional,
and generally difficult to predict, but there are identifiable likelihoods that can help provide
greater insight into an important dynamic.
The public’s interpretation of exchanges with law enforcement, was a concern for
officers and articulated in their responses for Scenario 5—verbal challenges at a public
demonstration, with no apparent recording of officers. Respondents were concerned that the
appearance of LE inaction would embolden protestors and escalate into further civil
disobedience or violence. Many stating they would take enforcement action in Scenario 5
because, “failing to act can get out of control” or “…you protect free speech, but not at the
expense of public order and safety.”
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Managing Statistical Significance with Strategy
Scenarios 1-3, as well as enforcement decisions when interacting with minorities,
teenagers, or the impact of negative law enforcement news in the media, did not demonstrate
statistical significance. Just because these specific areas did not indicate statistical significance,
does not discount the policy, training, and discursive significance, articulated in officers’
responses and open field explanations, justifying their enforcement decisions. Just as LE rely on
public confidence and credibility to secure the trust necessary to police society, so too does
policy require public confidence and credibility. “Police departments and training units need to
focus on the development and sustainment of attitudes consistent with being fair and just”
(Chappell & Piquero, 2004).
Limiting ourselves to purist arguments and narrowly scripted findings runs the risk of
creating a dearth of information on any topic. Kettl warns that these unknown unknowns result
in policy lightening (p. 146) but for many reasons, once unknowns are revealed, we still seem to
repeat flawed decision making. The difficulty in postponing policy reform, or the inability to
make necessary (albeit sometime difficult) policy revisions, further disempowers policy
reformers, to adopt the type of logic that some institutions and practices are just too big to fail
(Kettl, 2014, pp. 147-148).
The importance of this study is beyond assessing the opinions of officers for field scenarios
and interacting with different demographics. In terms of policy design and preparation, this
study can serve as an intelligence report to police agencies because it provides insight into how
officers see themselves and how they see the public in that discursive exchange. From a
strategic policy standpoint, knowing that officers are less likely to engage when a citizen holds
up a cell phone may be disconcerting to some police executives and empowering to activists.
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This disengagement phenomena with publicly introduced cell phones, may change over
time, if more officers are issued BWCs and law enforcement training conditions them to
disregard or accept the presence of public recording. In this study, approximately one-third of
the officers wear BWCs. Smith and Anderson (2018, p.1), of the Pew Research Center,
commenting on internet trends, usage, and technology found, “There are substantial differences
in social media use by age. Some 88% of 18- to 29-year-olds indicate that they use any form of
social media. That share falls to 78% among those ages 30 to 49…[and continues to decline with
age].”
Recommendations
This researcher recommends, increased use of intersectionality as a variable, to test for
the potentiality of disparate impact to groups that may remain unrealized due to aggregated
variable classifications. This can be particularly useful in policy analyses, ethical government
practices, and inclusive problem-solving efforts, to minimize exclusion of groups that
historically/currently feel marginalized.
Law enforcement must comprehensively work on strengthening public messaging that
already exists through Community Policing units in many police departments. Community
contacts are a department’s allies in balancing improperly couched narratives disseminated
through social media. This tactic could help ensure officer safety, maintain fundamental public
confidence in their police, and keep officers from disengaging with the public, despite initial
negative feedback from citizens.
If social media and public messaging are driving the future of communications platforms
with young people (Smith & Anderson, 2018), police agencies need to examine their recruitment
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strategies, so the mistakes and misinformation that may be setting the discourse for policecommunity relations, is not carried over into hiring policy.
Policy Options
In order to address concerns of potential de-policing, intersectionality, and selflegitimacy, messaging is key to maintaining communication with the community police serve.
What better test of a police department’s efficacy and messaging than the representativeness of
their recruitment and hiring policies, for the municipalities they serve.
Overall, the membership in American police departments are generally representative of
the U.S. population (Morin et al, 2017, p.11). In places where it is not, law enforcement
executives grow concerned of a disconnect, similar to what occurred in Ferguson, Missouri in
2014, where a majority of the police department did not reflect the community they served. Not
having equity and inclusion in a police department can polarize communities, and exacerbate
crises.
Police recruitment strategies
A cohesive police department (where no group of officers feel ostracized or
disenfranchised) is key to supporting self-legitimacy in policing and potentially reducing the
incidence of de-policing. This has proven challenging for the New York City Police Department
(NYPD) to produce a workforce representative of the population. In 2015, NYPD Police
Commissioner William Bratton stated he was working, “to improve NYPD minority
recruitment…because the NYPD is stronger when it looks more like the city it serves” (Bratton,
2015c, p. 2).
The context of that statement was rooted in the fact that although NYC was 26% black,
the compliment of black NYPD officers was 15.4% (Bratton, 2015c, p.3). The NYPD found that
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some of the impediments to hiring were the long and impersonal process (taking as long as four
years), as well as the apparent “lack of support for applicants, and the lack of transparency”
throughout the hiring process (Bratton, 2015c, p. 4; K. Royster, personal communication,
October 29, 2018). “A candidate [had] to go to four different places to get everything done”
(Barker, 2015). In response, the NYPD centralized much of their recruitment strategy, used
online platforms to interact with applicants and candidates, and hired a professional advertising
company to manage their marketing and messaging (K. Royster, personal communication,
October 29, 2018; M. Watcher, 2018).
Recruitment challenges
Market research indicates that recruiting the next generations of young workers into the
public sector and government work will be challenging. “Even among graduates of public affairs
programs, the interest in joining the public sector is dwindling as Baby Boomers retire and
Millennials look elsewhere to make an impact on society” (Linos, 2018b). A police department
without an involved and adaptive recruitment initiative may face a crisis in human capital. This
can have a direct impact on moral, work conditions, scheduling, and eventually public safety.
When asked about identifying current challenges to police recruitment, Watcher (2018)
expressed some of the same concerns as Lino (2018b). “It certainly is not easy. Police
departments don’t have the same tools available to them that private companies might—no
signing bonuses, limited flexibility in job descriptions, and a multitude of other restrictions”
(Linos, 2018b).
Effects of targeted messaging
Linos (2018b) examined how directed messaging impacts respondent willingness to
apply for careers in law enforcement. Her study involved sending 10,000 post card invites to
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join their local police departments to random people between 18-40 years old (Linos, 2018b).
Linos used four different recruitment messages in her study (in four variations of post cards):
challenge, serve, impact, and career (Linos, 2018a, pp. 73-73). Linos found the messages most
attractive to applicants were those, “that focus on the challenge of being a police officer and
messages that focus on the long-term career benefits” (Linos, 2018a, p. 77). “Put together,
messages that focus on personal benefits are three times as effective as the control and are
particularly effective for applicants of color and women” (Linos, 2018a, p.77).
We see from Linos’ study (2018a) that blanked marketing (with a generic job
announcement) is less effective than targeted marketing. From Linos’ work, and results from the
NYPD’s shift in recruitment strategy, this author concludes that effective marketing (i.e.,
successful recruiting) is about clear messaging, where the applicant sees themselves filling the
role messaged in the advertisement. The NYPD’s new recruitment strategy appropriately
addresses concerns shared by Linos’ (2018b), suggesting that easing the administrative burdens
placed on candidates in the hiring process, might improve the application process.
Leveraging a best practice
Other police departments experiencing difficulty with attaining representative recruitment
from their pool of hirable candidates may find the NYPD’s utilization of a multi-platformed,
comprehensive recruitment campaign, with a strong social media footprint, all managed by a
professional advertising agency a smart practice. A notable limitation for other departments
(particularly smaller, less well-funded agencies) may be cost, as the NYPD spends millions on
their recruitment initiative. This study recommends smaller departments consider joint or
regional advertising initiatives. By combining available funding opportunities and sharing costs,
other agencies can experiment with implementing proven recruitment initiatives.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Survey—Informed Consent Form
Introduction
You are requested to consider participating in a research study conducted by Christopher
Mercado for a dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Maki (Maria) Haberfeld of the
Department of Law, Police Science, and Criminal Justice Administration of John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, CUNY. You are asked to participate because of your position as a sworn
municipal law enforcement officer in the United States.
Purpose of this Study
This study asks you to provide feedback on what conditions would change your decision to take
discretionary enforcement action given the trends in recent years of officer-involved shootings
and use of force resulting in the death or injury of members of the public. When police use
force, it is sometimes captured on cell phone video and broadcast over the internet through social
media, sometimes in real-time. The resulting police response to this public challenge is referred
to by some scholars as the Ferguson Effect. You are asked to answer this survey’s questions
within your role as a law enforcement officer. The purpose of this research is to ascertain the
degree you feel the Ferguson Effect impacts your behavior in dealing with the public. I will also
ask you to provide feedback to determine if the Ferguson Effect causes you to rethink, reexamine, or second-guess interactions with the public shortly before and after they transpire.
Definitions
For clarity and easier interpretation, the term college will mean both colleges and universities.
For the purposes of this study, law enforcement officer includes all ranks of uniformed officers,
from chiefs and executives to entry-level officers (post-academy trained) including officers
recently graduated from their respective police academies and who may still be on probationary
status.
Confidentiality
This is an anonymous survey. You are reading the consent form. If you agree, activate the
consent when prompted and begin the survey after carefully reading all instructions. Your
responses are anonymous. No IP addresses or emails are recorded with (or attributed to) this
survey.
Benefits of Taking Part in this Study
Your responses in this survey can help shape future police/community engagement policy and
training as well as assist police departments and community groups with revising (and hopefully
improve) existing policy.
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Compensation
There is no compensation for participating in this study.
If you agree to participate in this study, activate the appropriate response when on the computer.
Do not put your name in any of your responses for the open-ended questions. This survey could
take approximately 15 minutes to complete but be clear with your answers.
Upon request, this researcher will share his findings with survey respondents.
This educational study uses human research participants and is subject to ethical and legal
guidelines. The proposal for this research and the survey tool to collect data for it were submitted
and approved by John Jay College of Criminal Justice’s Institutional Review Board. There is no
risk involved in participating in this research. No data identifying you will be released to the
university or your department. All research will be conducted with the highest ethical standards
for anonymity.
Your rights in this study are:
1. Have the purpose, expected risks, and potential benefits fully explained to you before you
choose to participate
2. Withdraw from participation at any time without penalty
3. Refuse to answer a particular question without penalty
4. Be informed of the results of the study
If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact the researcher, Christopher
Mercado at chmercado@jjay.cuny.edu

Declaration of Consent (Check only one box, sign your name, fill in today’s date)
I have carefully read the informed consent form for this research.

•

Yes, I consent to answer this survey

•

No, I do not consent to answer this survey
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Appendix B: Survey Questions
Instructions:
Answer each question honestly and from your position as a law enforcement officer.
Some answers require you to respond along a scale. Clearly mark your choices for these answers.
Only choose one response that best answers the question for these types of questions. Some
questions are “fill in.” Use the space provided to write your answer. Do not place your name or
other personally identifying marks on the survey. This helps ensure your anonymity.

Make sure to completely fill out each answer. Thank you for your participation in this.
Sincerely, Christopher Mercado.

Part I: General Questions: select only one option or fill in the blank
Question 1: Which identifier best describes your position with your department?
 Non-supervisor (e.g. Police officer, deputy sheriff, constable, corporal, senior patrol
officer, detective, or investigator)
 Supervisor (e.g. Sergeant: first-line/field supervisor; Lieutenant: first-tier middlemanagement, platoon commander; Captain: first-level executive, commander, Major,
Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel; Chief or sheriff: one, two, three, etcetera stars, or seniorlevel executive)

Question 2: Which category best describes the nature of your assignment?
 Field operations/enforcement (patrol, narcotics, vice, SWAT/special services, etc.)
 Staff & support/administrative/clerical (primarily office work)
 Training/instructional (e.g. police academy instructor)
 Quality control/internal compliance/internal affairs
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Question 3: Which category best identifies your gender identity?
 Female
 Male
 Non-gender specific (other)

Question 4: Which range best captures your age?
 20—29 years old
 30—39 years old
 40—49 years old
 50—over

Question 5: What is your highest education level achieved?
 High School diploma
 High School with some college, but no college degree
 Associate degree
 Baccalaureate degree
 Master’s degree
 Law degree
 Doctorate

Question 6: Which best describes your seniority with your department (i.e. time on the job)?
 Newly graduated from the academy—5 years
 6 years—10 years
 11 years—15 years
 16 years—20 years
 21 years—25 years
 26 years—30 years
 31 years—35 years
 36 years or more
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Question 7: Which best describes your family status?
 Single—never married
 Married
 Married but separated
 Divorced
 Single—widowed

Question 8: What is your race/ethnicity? For multiracial respondents, chose the one category
that best defines you.
 African-American (i.e. Black)
 Caucasian (i.e. White)
 Hispanic/Latino(a)
 Asian or Pacific Islander
 American Indian (i.e. First Nation) or Alaskan Native
 Other (________________) If selected, please specify

Question 9: As a law enforcement officer, how would you define your primary role?
 Safety expert
 Crime fighter
 Problem solver
 First responder/rescuer
 Peacekeeper

Question 10: Do you think you play an important role in public safety and maintaining social
order?
 Yes
 No
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Question 11: Do you think the public places negative labels on law enforcement officers?
 Yes
 No

Question 12: When on patrol, do you:
 Wear a body camera (Body Worn Camera or BWC)
 Have a vehicle mounted camera in your patrol car/cruiser
 Have both a BWC and car mounted camera
 Have neither

Part II: Please read each scenario and respond (check one response and fill in the answer)
IMPORTANT NOTE: For each scenario, you are in uniform (i.e. bullet resistant vest, gun, radio,
etcetera) on patrol, in a marked police car. There is no doubt or ambiguity to anyone on the
street, you are a law enforcement officer.

Scenario 1: You happen across an adult person violating the law. The offense constitutes a lowlevel misdemeanor (drinking in public, playing loud music, or similar offense impacting resident
quality-of-life). Assume your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no further
offenses. The offense may be correctable by either an arrest or summons. You can also decide to
exercise discretion and not take any enforcement action. There are other people in the vicinity of
the person but they do not appear to be involved.

Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?
 Yes
 No

Explain your reasons for your choice:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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Scenario 2: You encounter two adult people fighting in the street over a personal issue between
the two. You separate them and get them calm enough to tell you what happened. A
disagreement over the final score of a sporting event led to an exchange of fists. Neither party
seems physically injured. There are bystanders in the area but they are just watching what is
going on. Assume your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no further
offenses.

Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?
 Yes
 No

Explain your reasons for your choice:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Scenario 3: You have a motorist stopped for a traffic violation you observed. The motorist
hands over their license, registration, and insurance documents when ordered to do so. Assume
your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no further offenses. The offense may
be correctable by either an arrest or summons (depending on the infraction). You can also decide
to exercise discretion and not take any enforcement action.

Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?
 Yes
 No

Explain your reasons for your choice:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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Scenario 4: You encounter two adult people fighting in the street. You get out of your car,
separate the parties, start getting all the facts and begin asking people present what happened. It
does not appear to be a domestic case or robbery. Right now, it seems there was a disagreement
between two people that escalated to fists getting thrown. Neither party seems physically injured.
A bystander at the scene objects to you (a law enforcement officer) being there and pulls out a
cell phone with arm extended, obviously recording you. The person recording you does not
make any statements and is not physically preventing you from doing your job. You notice
other people present are doing the same thing and also use their cell phones to record your
handling of this incident. Assume your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no
further offenses.

Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?
 Yes
 No

Explain your reasons for your choice:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Scenario 5: A demonstration pops-up in front of you on the corner. There are about 8-10 adult
protestors holding up signs, chanting, handing out flyers to passersby, and demonstrating their
unhappiness with an issue. In order to ensure the sidewalk remains free and unobstructed, you
ask the protestors to remain in a given area of the block. This also keeps them from spilling into
the roadway and interfering with vehicular or bicycle traffic. Most comply. The protestors are
free to move around but remain in the general cordon you established. Assume these actions are
in accordance with your department’s policies and procedures. Two of the protestors are not
complying with the cordon you established, in violation of the law. They begin yelling at you.
They tell you and all those who would listen you are a racist, murderous arm of an oppressive
government. They are telling you how much their lives matter and say you should be ashamed
of yourself for the harm you do in communities. Some passersby agree and chime it but do not
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stop and continue on their way. No one appears to be recording you on any cell phone or
device. No one is physically preventing you from doing your job. One of the protestors not
complying with you loudly reads out your name and badge number from your uniform and says
you have no business or authority policing people.

Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?
 Yes
 No
Explain your reasons for your choice:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Scenario 6: You pulled over a motorist in their mid-30s for a traffic infraction. You have them
safely stopped; their windows are rolled down. You are standing outside the motorist’s car,
talking to them as they remain seated in the driver’s seat. The motorist is handing you their
license, registration, and insurance information. Pedestrian and vehicular traffic is typical for the
time of day. The motorist gets the attention of some people on the sidewalk and says to them,
“This is garbage. Pulling me over because the officer must think I’m in the wrong neighborhood
or something.” The motorist goes on to say to the bystanders, “This is profiling and
discrimination.” The motorist does not challenge you or converse with you specifically about
their discontent, but they continue to talk with the onlookers. You head back to your police car
with the motorist’s documents. You notice some pedestrians are writing down on paper the
intersection, your radio car number, and making notes about the stop. You hear one person
writing down the information tell another, “Try to get his name and badge number too. We may
need it later.” No one is recording you on any cell phones or devices. No one is physically
interfering with you.
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Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?
 Yes
 No
Explain your reasons for your choice:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

THIS ENDS THE SCENARIOS – PLEASE ANSWER THESE LAST FEW QUESTIONS
Question 13: In the above scenarios, suppose the violator(s) are teens (below 18 years old). Are
you:
 Likely to take enforcement action
 Unlikely to take enforcement action
Regardless of your answer, please explain why:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

Question 14: Since 2014, there were several protests and events across the United States
connected with police practices, tragedies, and loss of life for officers and members of the public.
Many of these issues concern police interaction with members of minority communities (i.e.
people of color). When interacting with members of the minority community in enforcement
action for low-level misdemeanor or petty offenses (when compared to other ethnic groups you
encounter). Are you:
 More likely to extend discretion to the person
 Less likely to extend discretion to the person
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Regardless of your answer, please explain why:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

Question 15: When news stories break in other parts of the country involving U.S. law
enforcement officers attacked, involved in corruption scandals, or videoed in potentially negative
situations, are you affected by those events, even if that agency and municipality is far from your
own?
 Yes
 No

Question 16: Where are you most likely to get your information and news on what is going on
with law enforcement officers in the U.S.? Please pick only one.
 Your department’s supervisors, leaders, or executives
 Broadcast news networks (e.g., Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, ABC, CBS)
 Social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, Tumblr, Snapchat)
 Union officials or union delegates (e.g., benevolent associations, Fraternal Order of
Police)
 Informal groups composed of peers and co-workers
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Question 17: When negative law enforcement news is in the public discourse, which of the
below choices (pick one) best describes how you’ve felt:
 You ask yourself, “Is this also a problem in my department too?”
 I need to be more safety conscious and tactically alert on patrol.
 Give it time and this will blow over.
 The activists may be right, this problem never gets properly addressed.
 Law enforcement is always getting unfairly maligned and mischaracterized in the news.
 Depends on how “close to home” the incident is.
 It may help to “cut the public some slack” during enforcement encounters until this gets
better.
 I just continue to do my job as I have always done.

You are finished. This concludes the survey. Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix C: Agency Consent Form—Surveys
The _______________ Police Department grants Christopher Mercado—a PhD student
with John Jay College, City University of New York—permission and authority to administer
surveys to members of this department as part of his doctoral dissertation research in criminal
justice, examining police behavior and response. The survey will be administered through
Survey Monkey and sent as a link to their department email accounts.
These surveys are confidential which means respondents’ identities will not be released
or reported. Mr. Mercado reserves the right to administer follow-up survey questions (where
necessary) to clarify responses. Mr. Mercado’s research will be supervised by his dissertation
chairperson and in accordance with the precepts of John Jay/CUNY’s Institutional Review
Board.
The _________ Police Department agrees to designate a point-of-contact for Mr.
Mercado’s research that will liaise whenever necessary to complete this research. There is no
discernable financial cost to the ________________ Police Department for administering the
aforementioned survey. The data and survey tools remain the sole property of the researcher—
Christopher Mercado. Mr. Mercado agrees to share his research findings with the ____________
Police Department upon completion of his research, if requested.
Signature___________Agency Representative XXX Police Department
___________________Date

Signature_________Christopher Mercado (Researcher)
_________________Date
chmercado@jjay.cuny.edu, (C) 917-570-5212
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Appendix D: Interview Authorization
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Appendix E: Interview Questions on NYPD Recruitment
Below are the ten questions used to interview NYPD personnel about recruitment
practices. The questions allowed for open responses from interviewees. Respondents were
allowed to expand on their answers or qualify their statements.
1. What is/was your role in candidate recruitment?
2. How long were you with (or worked in) candidate recruitment?
3. What is your current assessment of the recruit hiring program?
4. How has that changed over time?
5. How much did those changes cost?
6. What changes (if any) were you part of?
7. What was the need for those changes?
8. How do you currently measure the recruiting program’s success and how has that
measure changed over time?
9. What changes (if an) do you want for the NYPD’s recruitment policy, programs,
and strategy?
10. Would you recommend NYPD hiring practices to other departments?
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Appendix F: CITI Certification for Research with Human Subjects
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Appendix G: City University of New York—IRB Exemption Report
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Appendix H: Recommendations from the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing
Table 30: Recommendations from the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing
Strategy
Building Trust & Legitimacy

Policy & Oversight

Technology & Social Media

Community Policing & Crime
Reduction
Training & Education

Description
Promoting trust and ensuring legitimacy through
procedural justice, accountability, and honest
recognition
Developing policies on key topics while
implementing formal checks/balances and data
collection/analysis
Balancing technology and digital communications
with local needs, privacy, assessment, and
monitoring
Community partnerships to reduce crime

Partnerships with local and national training
facilities
Officer Wellness & Safety
Practices that support officer wellness and safety by
evaluating officer shift hours and data to prevent
injuries
Source: http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/policingtaskforce (p. 3)
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Appendix I: U.S. Law Enforcement Killed or Assaulted, Annual Data, 1988-2017
Table 31: Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted, 1988-2017
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Feloniously Killed
78
66
66
71
63
70
79

Assaulted
58,916
62,172
72,270
62,852
81,252
66,975
64,912

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

74
55
65
61
42
51
72
56
52

56,686
46,695
49,151
59,545
55,026
56,054
56,666
58,066
57,841

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

57
55
48
57
41
48
56
72
48
27

59,373
57,546
58,634
59,201
58,792
57,268
53,469
54,774
52,901
49,851

2014
2015
2016
2017

51
41
66
46

48,315
50,212
57,180
60,211

Note: Above data is found in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (https://ucr.fbi.gov/).
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Appendix J: Coding Classification for Open-text Scenario Reponses
Table 32: Aggregated Written Responses to Scenarios
Code
1

Written Responses
Yes, take enforcement action because you’re paid to enforce the law. Broken
Windows. To discourage poor behavior. Doing nothing sends the wrong message.
Because it’s the law. It’s my job. It’s my duty to enforce the law. Show no fear.
Adults are responsible for their actions. It’s department policy.

2

Yes, take enforcement action, but it depends on the circumstances. The decision is
conditional. Use discretion. You’re doing it to correct behavior. Look to take other
corrective action first.

3

No, don’t take corrective action. Use discretion. Are you addressing a chronic
condition? If the person is willing to cease and desist, don’t take enforcement
action.

4

Don’t take enforcement action. Not in today’s climate. Don’t lose your pension.
No public support to act. It’s not worth the aggravation. Can’t risk discipline. Don’t
be the bad guy. No political backing. Situation could go bad. The risk outweighs
the reward. Don’t want to escalate things. It will get dismissed at court. Don’t want
public scrutiny or the public berating me. Politicians want “hands off” policing.

5

Warn and admonish. Give a warning. Issue stern warning.

6

No enforcement because offense is minor. Petty offense. Not serious enough. Not
warranted. Bigger fish to fry.

7

Inappropriate response. Jibe at the researcher. Nonsensical. Objects to/disagrees
with the question.

8

Being recorded changes nothing, take enforcement action.

9

No offense here so no need for enforcement. Send them on their way.

10

Being recorded/challenged changes nothing, don’t take enforcement action.

11

Take enforcement action but request additional resources.

12

Because I’m being filmed/recorded, I’m more likely to exercise discretion.

13

Because I’m being filmed/recorded, I’m taking enforcement action. To the Civilian
Complaint Review Board, enforcement justifies stops/interactions.

133
Appendix K: Coding Classification, Open-text Reponses for Enforcement on Teenagers
Table 33: Aggregated Written Responses on Policing Teens
Code

Written Responses

1

No, don’t take enforcement action against the teen because juveniles are more
of a headache. They are more of a problem. Kids need more latitude. Give kids
a break. Why ruin their lives? This is a teaching moment. Kids will be kids.
Contact the parent. It’s a minor infraction. No crime here.

2

Yes, take enforcement action against the teen: because age is not a disqualifier.
This is a teaching opportunity for proper behavior. Correct the bad behavior
now. Correct them now because age has no bearing. Kids act worse than adults.

3

Warn and admonish.

4

Non-specific response. Unrelated commentary. Objection to the question.

5

No, don’t take enforcement action: age doesn’t make a difference. Age doesn’t
necessarily change the enforcement decision.

6

Yes, take enforcement action against the teen; age doesn’t make a difference.
The law is the law.

7

Yes, take enforcement action against the teen, but consider the kid’s demeanor
in your decision. Consider mitigating circumstances. Level of respect.

8

No, don’t take enforcement action against the teen, but consider the kid’s
demeanor (attitude/maturity) in your decision. Consider mitigating
circumstances.

9

Do nothing. It’s a waste of time. It’s useless to do anything in this scenario.
You have no political or police department support/back-up for your actions. I
don’t care anymore. Apathy response.

10

Yes, take enforcement action, to protect yourself against allegations of
corruption, misconduct, or malfeasance. Justified on YouTube.
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Appendix L: Coding Classification, Open Reponses on Minority Discretion
Table 34: Open Responses to Minority Discretion
Code
1

Written Responses
More likely to extend discretion; I treat everyone the same. I remain objective.
Race doesn’t matter to me.

2

Less likely to extend discretion; I treat everyone the same. Race doesn’t matter to
me.

3

More likely to extend discretion; since I judge the severity/gravity and totality of
the circumstances for each incident.

4

Less likely to extend discretion; since I judge the severity/gravity and totality of
the circumstances for each incident.

5

More likely to extend discretion; because I don’t want to be judged as racist.
Enforcement would look bad on social media. Fear of being scapegoated. Don’t
force a confrontation. It’s not worth it. Don’t escalate situation. Avoid complaints.

6

Less likely to extend discretion; because I’m treated unfairly and with hostility in
racial situations. I’m more likely to be challenged.

7

Warn and admonish.

8

Open response. Commentary not tied to any of the choices. Inappropriate
response. Question considered offensive. Objection to the question. Nonsensical
comment. Expressed indifference or confusion in their written response.

9

More likely to extend discretion, because my department/agency, the city, “they,”
or society expect me to be lenient with minorities. Leadership changed.

10

Less likely to extend discretion, and I will thoroughly document/record.
everything about the encounter. I need to, “cover my butt.” Need to go by the
book. Avoid problems. Avoid discipline.

11

More likely to extend discretion to acknowledge or correct prior wrongs or to
combat implicit or historical biases. To change past negative perceptions of law
enforcement. Work within the norms of a community.
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